Australia’s Experience with Foreign Direct Investment
by State Controlled Entities: A Move Towards
Xenophobia or Greater Openness?
Greg Golding
Over the last few years, there has been considerable debate in Australia as to the appropriate regulation of foreign direct investment by
entities affiliated with foreign governments. During that time, Australia
has been a significant beneficiary of investment by sovereign wealth
funds from many foreign jurisdictions, particularly by Chinese state
owned enterprises. The Australian government, similar to governments
of many developed Western countries, has struggled to properly calibrate its policy settings for regulating this type of investment activity.
This Article considers the Australian regulatory regime and assesses
Australia’s experience in regulating those investment flows during this
period.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a growing global debate has focused on the appropriateness of restrictions on foreign direct
investment (FDI) by entities controlled in some way by foreign governments. It is no surprise that this debate has coincided with the rise in
economic power of the BRIC1 nations, national insecurities arising from
the spread of global terrorism, and the challenges of the global financial
crisis in the period following the worldwide economic collapse of 2007.
Australia is at the epicenter of this debate. In the early stages of the
global financial crisis, the role of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) came
under increasing scrutiny as SWFs invested heavily outside their home



Partner, King & Wood Mallesons, Sydney.
1. BRIC stands for Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
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local jurisdictions, particularly in struggling financial institutions.2 Further, as a once-in-a-generation resources boom developed in Australia,
increased interest in Australian investment from Chinese state owned
enterprises (SOEs) posed certain challenges, particularly when considered in the context of the developing Australia–China trade relationship.
The purpose of this Article is to assess the effectiveness of the Australian regulatory regime in addressing the policy challenges posed by
SWF and SOE foreign direct investment in Australia.
II. THE STATE OF THE FDI DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA
Australia has a long history of economic growth facilitated by FDI:
In the early part of the twentieth century and in the decades following the
Second World War, foreign investment helped fund the expansion of the
infrastructure required to support Australia’s rapidly growing population.
This period of economic growth extended through the 1970s when foreign investment assisted the development of some of Australia’s nowkey mineral resource projects.3
The significance of foreign investment to Australian growth arises
from the historically low level of savings in the Australian economy. Access to foreign investment, particularly in capital-intensive areas such as
the resources sector, has enabled Australia to achieve a higher rate of
economic growth than would otherwise be the case.4 Competition for the
limited capital within Australia to fund growth would increase the cost of
capital by driving up interest rates and result in slowed rates of investment and growth. Impeding or blocking FDI can also be expected to de2. Those investments in late 2007 and early 2008 included a US$10 billion investment by
Singapore General Investment Corporation in UBS; a US$3 billion investment by Temasek in Barclays; a US$5 billion investment by China Investment Corporation in Morgan Stanley; a US$7.5
billion investment by Abu Dhabi Investment Authority; a US$7 billion investment by Singapore
General Investment Corporation in Citigroup; a US$4.4 billion investment by Temasek; a US$2
billion investment by Korean Investment Fund; and a US$2 billion investment by Kuwait Investment Fund in Merrill Lynch. As the global financial crisis developed, the role of SWFs as investors
was replaced by direct investment by governments to stabilize the international financial system,
leading to partial or full nationalization of a number of financial institutions.
3. For an overview of the historical contribution of FDI in Australia, see Brian Fisher et al.,
The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment and the Mining Industry to Welfare of Australians
(Comm. for the Econ. Dev. of Austl., Information Paper No. 92, 2008), available at https://www.ced
a.com.au/research-and-policy/research/2009/11/infopapers/ip_92.
4. It has been suggested that during the period between the 1960s and the 1980s, when trade
and investment were negatively affected by a restrictive foreign policy and other protectionist policies, capital productivity declined by 30%. See Ted Evans, Sec’y to the Treasury, Speech at the
Ninth Annual Colin Clark Memorial, Economic Nationalism and Performance: Australia from 1960s
to the 1990s 7–10 (June 3, 2009) (Austl.), available at http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.php?pid=
UQ:10449 &dsID=econ_dp_258_99.pdf.
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press the expected returns from investing in host-country assets. A hostgovernment veto of a proposed FDI signals to potential foreign investors
that they will have to deal with only residents of that country in a future
sale, thus reducing the potential pool of future purchasers.5
Foreign investment has also had spillover benefits for Australian
businesses, including technology transfer and improved management
expertise.6 These forms of intangible capital are difficult to quantify but
are believed to have positive implications for domestic economic welfare
and yield productivity gains. Foreign investment also contributes to the
strength of Australia’s trade relationships7 and can help to reduce security risks through the development of strong political and economic relationships between investing nations.8
The general benefits of FDI are recognized and advanced globally
through principles adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).9 The OECD advances the general
principle that foreign investment should be treated in the same way as
domestic investment. This principle is recognized by the OECD Code of
Liberalization of Capital Movements, first enacted in 1961,10 and the

5. See Dave Heatley & Bronwyn Howell, Overseas Investment: Is New Zealand ‘Open for
Business’?, NEW ZEALAND INST. STUDY COMPETITION & REGULATION, 11 (June 21, 2010),
http://www.iscr.org.nz/n578.html.
6. Stephen Kirchner, Capital Xenophobia II: Foreign Direct Investment in Australia, Sovereign
Wealth Funds and the Rise of State Capitalism, CENTRE INDEP. STUD., 2 (Nov. 1, 2008),
http://www.cis.org.au/images/stories/policy-monographs/pm-88.pdf (Austl.).
7. Rio Tinto, as a recipient of significant foreign direct investment into assets it owns, has
commented that Japan’s investment in its Robe River operations helped to underpin rapid growth in
its Robe River production and its sales to Japan. See Rio Tinto, Foreign Investment: A Foundation
for Australia’s Prosperity, PARLIAMENT AUSTRALIA, 20 (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.aph.gov.au/
Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed%20inquiries/2008-10/firb_09/su
bmissisions/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2008_10/firb_09/sub
missions/sub47_pdf.ashx (submission to the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Economics,
Inquiry into Foreign Investment by State-Owned Entities).
8. KATHRYN GORDON & APRIL TASH, OECD, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT–CONTROLLED
INVESTORS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRY INVESTMENT POLICIES: A SCOPING PAPER 7 (2009) (Fr.),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/42022469.pdf.
9. Australia is one of the thirty-four member countries of the OECD. Members and Partners,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
10. OECD, CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (2013), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/CapitalMovements_WebEnglish.pdf. In accordance
with Article 1 of the Code, member states shall progressively abolish between one another restrictions on movements of capital to the extent necessary for effective economic cooperation, including, without limitation, treating all nonresident-owned assets in the same way irrespective of the
date of formation. Members shall endeavor to extend those principles to all members of the International Monetary Fund.
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OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, first enacted in 1976.11
In advancing this principle, the OECD also recognizes the international legal precept that governments are entitled to protect their national
security. National security may be threatened by foreign non-commercial
investment in sensitive areas. As such, it is accepted that foreign investment regulation may be appropriate where national security might be at
risk. The relevant OECD Council12 has recommended that where a recipient country imposes restrictions on foreign investment for national security reasons, such measures should be formulated narrowly so that the
regulatory regime is predictable, transparent, proportionate, and accountable.13
It is an unfortunate political reality in Australia that many members
of the general population have a negative attitude toward FDI and do not
appear to appreciate the economic benefits derived from access to such
investment. A Lowy Institute Poll of Australians’ opinions on foreign
direct investment reported that 90% of those surveyed believed that the
Australian government has a responsibility to keep Australian companies
under majority Australian control.14 Further, 85% of those surveyed said
that investments by companies controlled by foreign governments should
be more strictly regulated than investments by foreign private investors.15
The key criticisms leveled against Australia’s foreign investment
regime are a lack of transparency and accountability. The foreign investment review process in Australia is inherently political in its ultimate
decision making. The Treasurer is not required to publish reasons for
decisions, and there is no system of appeal after a decision is made.

11. OECD, DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (2011) (Fr.), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Consolidated
DeclarationTexts.pdf. The Declaration provides guidelines of good practice regarding government
conduct in relation to multinational enterprises. “National Treatment,” Item II of the Declaration,
requires that adhering governments should, among other things, “consistent with the need . . . to
protect their . . . interests,” accord to enterprises operating in their territories and owned by foreign
nationals treatment under their laws that are no less favorable than treatment “accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises.” Id. at 5.
12. In this context, the relevant council is the OECD Council on Recipient Country Investment
Policies Relating to National Security.
13. OECD, GUIDELINES FOR RECIPIENT COUNTRY INVESTMENT POLICIES RELATING TO
NATIONAL SECURITY (2009) (Fr.), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/433
84486.pdf.
14. FERGUS HANSON, THE LOWY INSTITUTE POLL 2008: AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD: PUBLIC
OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY 6–7 (2008), available at http://lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Lowy_
Poll08_Web1.pdf.
15. Id.
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III. GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ENTITIES: SWFS AND SOES.
A. What Is An SWF, and What Special Concerns Arise?
An SWF is defined as a special purpose investment fund or other
arrangement that is owned by a general government.16 SWFs are not new
as an asset class. The oldest SWF, the Kuwait Investment Authority, was
established in 1953. In recent years, the number of SWFs has proliferated. There are now SWFs in many parts of the world, including Australia.17 SWFs are currently estimated to hold assets of approximately
US$5.2 trillion,18 and this is expected to grow significantly in the coming
years.
SWFs cover a broad range of investment vehicles, investment objectives, and governance structures. Some of the different types of SWFs
include the following:
 Revenue stabilization funds,19
 Future generation savings funds,20
 Holding funds,21 and
 General SWFs.22

16. INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 3, 27 (2008) [hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
17. The Future Fund and Queensland Investment Corporation are Australian examples of
SWFs.
18. THECITYUK, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.thecit
yuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/sovereign-wealth-funds-2013/. This report states that there is
an additional US$7.7 trillion held in other sovereign investment vehicles, such as pension reserve
funds and development funds. Id.
19. Revenue stabilization funds are designed to cushion the impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal revenues. Examples include the Russian Reserve Fund, Kuwait Reserve Fund, and
Mexico Oil Stabilization Fund.
20. Future generation savings funds are investments of national wealth intended to be held over
long timeframes. Funding sources are typically commodity or fiscal based. They are generally earmarked for particular purposes, e.g., future pension liabilities. Examples include Australia’s Future
Fund, the Norway Government Pension Fund, and the Kuwait National Prosperity Fund.
21. Holding funds constitute management of government direct investments in companies and
generally support government development strategies. Examples include Temasek, the China Investment Corporation, and the Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund.
22. General SWFs cover one or more of the above-listed examples and typically manage government excess wealth. Examples include the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and the Singapore
Government Investment Corporation.
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FDI by SWFs gives rise to various policy concerns for recipient countries, particularly with respect to an SWF’s potential impact on financial
stability, political motivations, and national security.
The debate regarding financial stability centers around the fact that
the governance arrangements surrounding SWFs and their operations
may be unregulated and lack transparency. Due to the size and financial
capacity of some SWFs, there are concerns that a lack of transparency
may mean that investment decisions made by SWFs could have destabilizing effects on financial systems.23 On the other hand, some commentators suggest that SWFs actually have a stabilizing effect on the financial
system by virtue of their long-term investment horizon, generally unleveraged positions, and capacity to enhance the depth and breadth of markets they serve. There is little, if any, evidence of investments being
made by SWFs for political rather than commercial purposes.24
Due to the potential influence the state may have over the operations and investment decisions of SWFs, there is a concern that SWFs
may exercise its control over recipient companies for political rather than
commercial purposes. There is also a concern that the closeness between
an SWF and the government of the SWF’s country may give that entity
privileges and advantages that are not available to other enterprises. Finally, there is concern that foreign governments may obtain access to
information or technology through the investments of SWFs, which
jeopardizes the recipient country’s national security.25
In view of some of these concerns, an International Working Group
(IWG) of SWFs was established by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in 2008.26 The working group drafted a set of generally accepted
principles reflecting agreed upon investment practices and objectives.27

23. See Sovereign Wealth Funds–A Work Agenda, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 4, 13 (Feb. 29,
2008), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf.
24. There is no example of an SWF exercising decision making in a way that has compromised
national security in any country in five decades. DAVID M. MARCHICK & MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS SPECIAL REPORT NO. 34, GLOBAL FDI POLICY: CORRECTING A
PROTECTIONIST DRIFT 27 (2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/international-finance/global-fdipolicy/p16503.
25. Id.
26. The development of the Santiago Principles was undertaken by the International Working
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, which comprised twenty-six member states of the IMF (including Australia) with SWFs. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 1.
27. The drafting committee was led by Mr. David Murray, then-Chairman of Australia’s Future
Fund. Id.
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In October 2008,28 the Santiago Principles were voluntarily adopted as a
set of SWF best practice objectives.
The Santiago Principles have attempted to address these concerns
in various ways. While there are thirty-four principles and sub-principles
comprising the Santiago Principles, some of the key principles are as
follows:
 SWFs should have clearly defined policy purposes29 and clear
and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements to their general approach to funding and spending operations.30
 SWFs should have sound governance arrangements and clear
and effective division of roles and responsibilities31 with independent operational management.32
 The activities of SWFs should be conducted in compliance with
applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in the countries in which they operate.33
 The investment decisions of SWFs should be aimed to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns34 without seeking or taking
advantage of privileged information or inappropriate influence
by the broader government.35
 The exercise of ownership rights by SWFs in investments
should be consistent with investment policies.36
B. Distinguishing SWFs and SOEs
SWFs and SOEs differ in function as well as purpose. An SOE can
be defined as a commercial enterprise of which the state has significant
control through full, majority, or significant minority ownership.37
28. Press Release, Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, International Working
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds Presents the “Santiago Principles” to the International Monetary
and Financial Committee (Oct. 11, 2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pr/swfpr0806.htm.
29. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 7 (GAPP 2).
30. Id. (GAPP 4)
31. Id. (GAPP 6).
32. Id. at 7–8 (GAPP 9).
33. Id. at 8 (GAPP 15).
34. Id. (GAPP 19).
35. Id. (GAPP 20).
36. Id. at 9 (GAPP 21).
37. OECD, GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 11
(2005) (Fr.), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/soe/guidelines. The preamble
further notes that SOEs are often prevalent in utilities and infrastructure industries whose performance is of great importance to broad segments of the population. The rationale for state ownership
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While the following is a gross simplification, SWFs tend to make
portfolio or indirect investments through investment funds, whereas
SOEs typically make more commercially strategic investments to gain
synergies, economies of scale, or otherwise supplement or support their
commercial operations. Many developing countries, particularly BRIC
nations, have pursued growth through the establishment of SOEs to participate in key industries.38
C. The Particular Case of Chinese SOEs
Economic reform in China over the last two decades has been driven by government reliance on the establishment and development of
SOEs.39 Chinese SOEs are typically classified as enterprises “owned by
the Chinese government, and thus, by the whole people”40 of China.
Ownership rights are exercised by the State Council,41 the highest executive organ of the Chinese government. Most of the Council’s powers
have been delegated by legislation to the State Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC).
Chinese SOEs are established under Chinese law as separate legal
enterprises from the Chinese government with separate legal identities.
SOEs have their own individual operating assets, financial resources,
management teams, and workforces. Each SOE has autonomy from the
Chinese government in operational policies.
Chinese law precludes SASAC from interfering in the daily operations and business activities of SOEs; however, these limitations are subject to SASAC’s broad discretion to exercise its “contributor’s functions.” This means that SASAC, on behalf of the Chinese government,
enjoys the right to “return on assets, participation in major decisions,
[and] selection of managers.” In particular, each shareholder representa-

varies among countries and has typically composed of a mix of social, economic, and strategic interests. Id. at 9.
38. THECITYUK, supra note 18, at 7.
39. In 2007, it was estimated that there were approximately 115,000 SOEs in China. Press
Release, State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n [SASAC], General Information on
Reform and Development of SOEs over the Past Five Years Since the Establishment of SASAC
(Aug. 10, 2008) (China), available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2964712/5349959.html.
40. Qi ye guo you zi chan fa (中华人民共和国企业国有资产管理法) [Law on the StateOwned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28,
2008, effective May 1, 2009) art. 3 (China), available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n11
183/n11244/5751091.html.
41. Interim Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-Owned Assets of Enterprises
(promulgated by the State Council, effective May 27, 2003) art. 4 (China), available at
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n13933222/13934025.html.
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tive appointed by SASAC to an SOE is required by law to present opinions and exercise voting rights according to the instructions of SASAC.42
There is little evidence that Chinese SOEs operating offshore have
engaged in non-commercial behavior.43 In 2009 at the Senate Economics
Committee’s inquiry into foreign investment by SWFs and SOEs, the
Executive Member of the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB)
stated that commercial behavior was a feature of Chinese SOE conduct
in Australia.44
When any Chinese domestic enterprise—in such capacity as an
SOE, a privately owned enterprise (POE), or a foreign-owned investment
enterprise (FIE)—proposes to make a particular investment outside of
China, it must obtain approvals from Chinese governmental bodies prior
to making that investment. Approval is sought after the investment decision has been made by the relevant enterprise, and it must be obtained
from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). The NDRC and MOFCOM
each apply the same standards to and impose the same requirements on
all Chinese commercial entities seeking offshore investment approval
(regardless of whether they are an SOE, a POE, or a FIE).
Before the investment approval process begins, the NDRC conducts
a preliminary review to confirm that there is no “material adverse factor.”45 The NDRC and MOFCOM each consider applications for offshore investment approval in accordance with the provisions of the
Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalogue
and the relevant regulations on the examination and approval of overseas
investment projects.46 Once approvals are received from NDRC and
42. The Law on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, supra note 40, at art. 13.
43. John Larum & Jingmin Qian, A Long March: The Australia–Chinese Investment Relationship, AUSTRALIA CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, 12 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://acbc.com.au/deploycontrol/files/
upload/news_nat_fdi_report_oct.pdf.
44. Senate Economic References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Foreign
Investment by State-Owned Entities, Hearing Transcript (June 22, 2009) E4 (Patrick Colmer, General Manager of the Foreign Investment and Trade Policy Division) (Austl.), available at
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/12158/toc_pdf/69252.pdf;fileTy
pe=application%2Fpdf#search=%22(()%20committees)%20economics%20references%20committe
e%20senator%20joyce%22 (“While there is a much greater formal link between a Chinese company
and the Chinese government, what we see, by and large, is a fair degree of overt commercial behavior on the part of the Chinese companies seeking to invest in Australia.”).
45. Notice of the National Development and Reform Commission on Issues Concerning the
Improvement of the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev.
& Reform Comm’n, effective June 8, 2009) (China), available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/
zcfbtz/2009tz/t20090619_286696.htm.
46. See Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalog (promulgated by
the Ministry of Commerce & the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, effective July 8, 2004) CHINA L. &
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MOFCOM, applications must be made to the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) for the purpose of foreign exchange registration relating to such offshore investment. Approval for offshore investment by an SOE must also be obtained from SASAC.
The NDRC is primarily concerned with reviewing the size and nature of the proposed offshore investment and the capacity of the SOE to
make that investment, focusing specifically on national economic security and compliance with industry policies of the Chinese government.47
MOFCOM considers a variety of factors when reviewing an application
to invest offshore.48 In 2012, SASAC announced new guidelines requiring greater due diligence and risk management procedures for overseas
investments.49
While Chinese investment in Australia for the 2011–2012 fiscal
year fell short of investment Australia received from the United States
and the United Kingdom, FDI from China has increased significantly in
recent years, as evidenced by its rise in rank from eleventh on FIRB’s
2006–2007 Annual Report (on the sources of proposed foreign invest-

PRAC.; Measures for Overseas Investment Management (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce,
Mar. 16, 2009, effective May 1, 2009) (China), available at http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/
law/200904/t20090402_202192.html; Interim Measures on Administration of Examination and
Approval of Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n,
effective Oct. 9, 2004) (China), available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/timftaoeaao
toip1038/.
47. In general, NDRC will consider the following factors when reviewing a foreign investment
proposal: compliance with the laws and regulations of the state; compliance with the applicable
industry policies; consideration for sustainable development of the economy and society; consideration for the development of strategic resources required for developing the national economy; possible benefits for technology improvement and development; and the financing plan and financial
capability of the Chinese investor. Interim Measures on Administration of Examination and Approval of Overseas Investment Projects, supra note 46, at art. 18.
48. Measures for Overseas Investment Management, supra note 46, at art. 9. (“Where the
overseas investment of an enterprise is within any of the following circumstances, the Ministry of
Commerce or the provincial commerce department shall disapprove it: (1) endangering the state
sovereignty, national security, and public interests of China, or violating a law or regulation of China; (2) damaging the relationship between China and a relevant country or region; (3) likely violating any international treaty concluded by China with a foreign party; or (4) involving any technology
or goods prohibited by China from import.”); see also Interim Measure on Administration of Examination and Approval of Overseas Investment Protjects, supra note 46, at art. 18.
49. Wei Chen & Jiahao Xie, Chinese Update—New SASAC Rules Enacted to Consummate
Outbound Investment Supervisory System for Central SOEs, XBMA FORUM (July 4, 2012),
http://xbma.org/forum/chinese-update-new-sasac-rules-enacted-to-consummate-outbound-investm
ent-supervisory-system-for-central-soes/. Chinese companies face formidable obstacles in developing the expertise and experience necessary for global business success. David Shambaugh, Are China’s Multinational Corporations Really Multinational?, E. ASIA FORUM Q., Apr.–June 2012, at 7.
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ment in Australia) to third for 2011–2012.50 China is now Australia’s
most important trading partner51 and is still significantly underrepresented in terms of foreign investment in Australia when compared with its
dominant trade relationship.
Public perception of Chinese investment in Australia is one of general disapproval. In 2013, the Lowy Institute Poll reported that 57% of
those surveyed said that the Australian government is allowing too much
investment from China.52This principally negative community attitude is
further illustrated by the general tenor of the submissions received by the
Australian Senate Economies Inquiry into Foreign Investment by State
Owned Entities in 2009.53 From the Chinese perspective, Chinese investors perceive a lack of trust and have concerns about discrimination as
compared with FDI sourced from other countries.54
IV. OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S FOREIGN INVESTMENT
REGULATORY REGIME
Foreign investment in Australia is regulated by the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (the Act)55 and by the Australian gov-

50. Annual Report 2005–06, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD, 30 (Dec. 11, 2006),
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/publications/annualreports/2005-2006/_downloads/2005-06_FIRB_
AR.pdf (Austl.); Annual Report 2011–12, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD, 39 (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/Publications/AnnualReports/2011-2012/_downloads/FIRB-AnnualReport-2011-12_v4.pdf (Austl.).
51. NEIL BATTY & FRANK BINGHAM, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, AUSTRALIA’S
EXPORTS TO CHINA 2001–2011, at 3 (2012) (Austl.), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/publication
s/stats-pubs/australias-exports-to-china-2001-2011.pdf.
52. ALEX OLIVER, THE LOWY INSTITUTE POLL 2013: AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD: PUBLIC
OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY 6 (2013) (Austl.), available at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/low
ypoll2013_web_corrected_p5.pdf.
53. On March 18, 2009, the Senate made a referral to the Senate Standing Committee on Economics to inquire and report on the international experience of SWFs and SOEs on its role in acquisitions of significant shareholdings in corporations; the impact and outcomes of such acquisitions on
business growth and competition; and the Australian experience in the context of Australia’s foreign
investment arrangements. The Committee reported its findings on September 17, 2009. No material
changes to the Australian regime were recommended in the final report. Senate Economic References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Foreign Investment by State-Owned Entities (2009) 61–
62 (Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Econo
mics/Completed%20inquiries/2008-10/firb_09/report/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/economic
s_ctte/completed_inquiries/2008_10/firb_09/report/report_pdf.ashx.
54. Larum & Qian, supra note 43, at 10–11.
55. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) (Austl.). Prior to the adoption of the
Act, foreign investment had largely been regulated through foreign exchange control mechanisms.
Foreign Investment Policy in Australia—A Brief History and Recent Developments, TREASURY, 64
(Apr. 16, 2012), http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/195/PDF/round5.pdf (Austl.) [hereinafter
A Brief History and Recent Developments]. Interim arrangements had been in place since 1972.
Companies (Foreign Takeovers) Act 1972 (Cth) (Austl.).
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ernment’s Foreign Investment Policy (the Policy).56 The Federal Treasurer is ultimately responsible for all decisions relating to foreign investment and for administration of the Policy. The Treasurer is advised and
assisted by the FIRB, which administers the Act in accordance with the
Policy. FIRB is an administrative body with no statutory existence, and
while the Act makes no reference to it whatsoever, the Policy confirms
FIRB’s role.57 All decisions by the Treasurer relating to a foreign investment proposal are supported by analysis and recommendations made
by FIRB.
The purpose of this foreign investment approval regime is to empower the Treasurer to give orders with respect to proposals that are under consideration that may be “contrary to the national interest” of Australia.58 There is no definition in either the Act or the Policy for the term
contrary to the national interest, and each proposal is assessed on a caseby-case basis.59 Under the current Policy, the government determines
what is contrary to the national interest by having regard for the widely
held community concerns of Australians.60 The Australian government
does not publish reasons for decisions it makes under the Act or Policy.
When the Act was first introduced into Parliament in 1975, the
Treasurer suggested that the “national interest” criterion should be assessed by reference to a determination of (I) whether the proposed investment would have net economic benefits to Australia to justify the
change in foreign control; (ii) whether the foreign investor was expected
to follow practices consistent with Australian expectations; and (iii)
whether the proposal would be consistent with the government’s policy
objectives. In assessing these matters, the Treasurer suggested that the
government would look at factors such as Australian participation in
ownership, control, and management, as well as the interests of employees, shareholders, and creditors.61 In the mid-1980s, the government

56. Treasury, Austl. Gov't, Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV.
BOARD (Mar. 4, 2013), www.firb.gov.au/content/_downloads/AFIP_2013.pdf [hereinafter Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy].
57. Id. at 1.
58. Id.
59. In the Second Reading Speech for the Foreign Takeovers Bill 1975 in the House of Representatives, the Treasurer stated that the criteria for judging applications had not been incorporated
into the proposed legislation “because the criteria must be flexible in their interpretation and application[,] and it has been found that it would be impracticable, consistent with the need for such flexibility, to express the criteria with the precision required by legislative form.” Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, May 22, 1975, 2678 (Frank Stewart) (Austl.).
60. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, supra note 56, at 1.
61. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, supra note 59, at 2678–79.
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adopted a more liberal interpretation of the national interest criterion.62
The “net economic benefit” test was abandoned on the basis that foreign
direct investment was acknowledged to have clear economic benefits for
Australia.
Now, in considering whether the national interest test is sufficiently
met for approval, the Treasurer may impose conditions that he considers
necessary to protect the national interest of the Australian government.63
The Treasurer is under no obligation to justify or explain his reasons for
imposing such conditions. In the event that a foreign investor does not
comply with a condition, such noncompliance would constitute an offense and would thus reactivate the Treasurer’s powers under the Act.64
The Treasurer rarely rejects an investment application by a foreign
investor. Approximately 10,000 investment applications are received by
FIRB each year,65 and typically, less than 100 of these are rejected.66 Only two explicit rejections of a significant corporate transaction have occurred in the last decade: the rejection of Shell’s proposal to acquire
100% of Woodside Petroleum Limited in 200167 and Singapore Exchange’s proposal to acquire 100% of Australian Securities Exchange in
2011.68 In neither case did the involvement of an SWF or a SOE in the
proposed acquisition precipitate the rejection decision. Nevertheless, applicants have no right of administrative or judicial review of foreign investment decisions made under the Act or Policy. The Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 specifically exempts decisions
made under the Act from administrative review.69

62. A Brief History and Recent Developments, supra note 55, at 64.
63. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 25(1A) (Austl.).
64. Id. at ss 25(1C), (1D).
65. Annual Report 2011–12, supra note 50, at 19 (11,420 applications that year).
66. Id.
67. Foreign Investment Proposal— Shell Australia Investments Limited’s Acquisition of Woodside Petroleum Limited, PETER COSTELLO (Apr. 23, 2001), http://www.petercostello.com.au/press/2
001/2429-foreign-investment-proposal-shell-australia-investments-limiteda-s-shell. The rejection
was based on a view that Shell might not develop the North West Shelf projects of Woodside in
Australia as part of Shell’s broader portfolio of assets outside Australia as quickly as it would on a
stand-alone basis. Id.
68. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision’ (Media Release, No. 030, Apr. 8, 2011)
(Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2011/0
30.htm&pageID=&min=wms&Year=2011&DocType=0. Swan’s rejection was based on a view that
it is in the national interest for Australia to maintain the strength and stability of its financial system
and to build Australia’s standing as a global financial services center in Asia to take advantage of its
superannuation system and that he had concerns the proposal would be contrary to these objectives.
Id.
69. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) sch 1 para (h) (Austl.).
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In recent years, there have been several parliamentary reviews of
the foreign investment regime, particularly concerning SWF and SOE
investment70—and the associated approval regimes—applicable to rural
land.71 Those parliamentary reviews have not yet resulted in any change
to the basic structure of the Australian approval regime.72 The approval
regime is extremely convoluted in its regulatory structure, which comprises three key areas of regulation: transactions that require prior notification and mandatory approval under the Act; transactions that enliven
the Treasurer’s powers of divestiture under the Act; and transactions that
require prior approval under the Policy.
A. Compulsory Approval Under the Act
Under the Act, foreign persons must seek prior approval to acquire
(alone or together with their associates) control of 15% or more of voting
rights (or potential voting rights), or to acquire interests in 15% or more
of the issued shares (or rights to be issued shares) in an Australian corporation with gross assets of AU$248 million or more.73 It is an offense to
enter into such an acquisition without giving prior notification and obtaining a statement of approval by the government.

70. Senate Economic References Committee, supra note 53. No significant changes were proposed by this review. Id. at 61–62.
71. Senate Economic Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Foreign Acquisitions
Amendment (Agricultural Land) Bill 2010 (2011), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary
_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2010-13/forei
gn_acquisition_farmland_2011/index.htm; Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Foreign Investment and The National Interest (2013),
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/completed_inquiri
es/2010-13/firb_2011/report/report.ashx.
72. The June 2013 Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee majority
report proposes a much lower review threshold for agricultural land-cumulative purchases of AU$15
million or more for agricultural land and 15% or more of agribusinesses valued at AU$248 million
or more (indexed), or an investment of AU$54 million or more in an agribusiness, as well as a requirement to consider the interests of local communities in screening those proposals. Senate Rural
and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee, supra note 71, at 75.
73. The Act sets out the requirement to give prior notification. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975(Cth) s 26 (Austl.). However, there is an exemption where the corporation has gross
assets of less than AU$248 million (calendar year 2013). Id. s 13A(4)(b)(ii); Foreign Acquisitions
and Takeovers Regulations 1989 (Cth) reg 5(2) (Austl.). For investors in the United States and New
Zealand, an AU$1,098 million threshold applies (calendar year 2013), except for certain prescribed
sectors or where an entity is controlled by a United States or New Zealand governmental entity.
Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 17E (Austl.); Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulations 1989 (Cth) reg 9 (Austl.). Separately, the Act provides for a notification regime that
is compulsory with respect to acquisitions of interests in Australian urban land for which there is
generally no monetary threshold. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) § 26A (Austl.).
However, this Article is focused on the regulation of investment in corporations.
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For purposes of the Act, a foreign person is (I) any non-resident of
Australia; (ii) a corporation in which a nonresident holds voting rights or
issued shares of 15% or more; (iii) a corporation in which non-residents
in the aggregate hold voting rights or issued shares of 40% or more; or
(iv) trustees of trusts with foreign ownership beyond these thresholds.74
The interests of foreign persons and their associates are aggregated in a
given analysis. The meaning of “associate” is notoriously difficult to apply.75 For purposes of these provisions, the prohibition applies only to an
investment in an Australian corporation, i.e., a corporation incorporated
in Australia.76
For purposes of calculating a 15% interest in an Australian corporation, the potential right to acquire voting power or the right to be issued
shares is included.77 These provisions are expressed to capture all arrangements that involve a future right to acquire voting shares or issued
shares, regardless of the way in which they are structured, including debt
instruments having quasi-equity characteristics and convertible promissory notes.78 Structures that do not give rise to potential voting power or
rights to issued shares (e.g., cash-settled derivative structures) do not appear to fall within the compulsory notification regime but may nevertheless activate the Treasurer’s powers if the acquisition gives the person
the ability to determine the corporate policy in relation to any matter.79
This is considered further below.

74. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 26(1) (Austl.). For other definitions
in the Act, see id. at s 5. Where ownership is dispersed, obvious practical difficulties arise in seeking
to identify “foreign persons” if the 40% in the aggregate trigger is enlivened.
75. Id. at s 6. Unlike other provisions of Australian law seeking to track share ownership
thresholds, the “associate” reference is not primarily linked to action in concert. Compare id., with
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 1.2, div 2 (Austl.). For example, an associate is a company in which
a person and their associate have a 15% or more investment. Significant potential confusion is
caused by a provision that any person who is an associate of a person by one application of the definition is also an associate of the person by another application of the definition, see Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 6(l) (Austl.), causing a potential infinite regression of applications. The question arises in the foreign investment context in determining whether Chinese SOEs,
by virtue of their common government ownership, should be aggregated or assumed to be related or
associated. The Executive Member of FIRB has given evidence to the Senate Economics Committee
that for the purposes of the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeover Act 1975, Chinese SOEs are not
considered to be associated. Senate Economic References Committee, supra note 44, at E6.
76. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) ss 5, 13(I)(a)–(c) (Austl.).
77. Id. at s 9(1).
78. Id. at s 11(2A).
79. Id. at s 21(5).
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B. Treasurer’s Additional Powers Under the Act
The Act also gives the Treasurer power, in certain circumstances, to
give an order prohibiting a proposed transaction and, in cases in which a
transaction has already been completed, to direct a foreign person to dispose of shares or terminate arrangements.80 The Treasurer’s powers apply to a broader range of acquisitions than that which is captured by the
pre-approval requirement. However, the powers will only be activated
when the Treasurer determines the result of the acquisition to be contrary
to Australia’s national interest.81
The Treasurer’s powers are enlivened if a prescribed corporation
(defined infra) becomes controlled by foreign persons or if there is a
change in foreign control. Control by a foreign person is control of 15%
of the voting power or potential voting power; control of 15% of the issued shares (or rights to be issued shares) by an individual foreign person; control of 40% of the voting power or potential voting power; or
control 40% of the issued shares (or rights to be issued shares) by foreign
persons in aggregate.82 A change in foreign control occurs when a corporation is, in the aggregate, under at least 40% foreign control and when
there is a change to the organization of those foreign holders, unless the
Treasurer is satisfied that, upon review of all the surrounding circumstances, those persons are not in a position to determine the policy of the
corporation.83
The Act does permit that where a proposed transaction enlivens the
Treasurer’s powers, a foreign person can make an application such that if
no objection is raised, the Treasurer’s powers will be deactivated.84 The
practical implication of these provisions is that for significant transactions requiring commercial certainty, the Treasurer’s approval is inevitably sought.
The Treasurer’s powers extend to investments in prescribed corporations that carry on an Australian business85 and holding companies of
such prescribed corporations.86 A “prescribed corporation” includes off-

80. Id. at ss 18(2), 18(4), 19(2), 19(4), 20(2), 20(3), 21(2)–(3).
81. Id.
82. Id. at ss 9(1), 9(1A).
83. Id. at ss 9(1A), 9(2).
84. Id. at s 25(2)–(3).
85. The Act provides that “a reference in th[e] Act to an Australian business is to a business
carried on wholly or partly in Australia in anticipation of profit or gain” either alone or together with
another person. Id. at s 7(1).
86. Id. at s 18(1). The concept of a prescribed corporation is much broader in scope than an
“Australian corporation,” which is relevant to the prior approval test. Id. at s 26.
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shore companies with specified categories of Australian assets in which
the company’s gross Australian assets are valued at AU$248 million or
more and, for certain companies, make up more than 50% of the company’s global assets.87
The Treasurer’s powers also extend to the acquisition of assets, rather than an interest in shares, of a company. The Treasurer may prohibit
proposed acquisitions of assets valued at AU$248 million or more of an
Australian business carried on by a prescribed corporation that would
lead to the business coming under foreign control (or being controlled by
new foreign persons) if the result would be contrary to the national interest.88 An Australian business is “a business carried on partly or wholly in
Australia in anticipation of profit or gain.”89 For these purposes, control
means being “in a position to determine the policy of” the Australian
business.90
In addition to outright acquisitions, the Treasurer’s powers extend
to two situations in which the Australian government enters into such
arrangements with foreign persons that may influence the conduct of an
Australian business.91 The first situation arises when the following occurs:92
 An agreement is to be entered into concerning the affairs of a
corporation or is to alter an organizational document of a corporation.
 As a result, a director or directors of a corporation will be under
an obligation to act in accordance with the directions, instructions, or desires of a foreign person or an associate with control
as defined above.
 As a result, the corporation would be controlled by foreign persons or new foreign persons.
 The result would be contrary to the national interest.

87. The Act provides that a foreign corporation whose Australian assets make up not less than
one half of its gross assets is a prescribed corporation. Id.at s 13(1)(g). There is an exemption for
companies where the total assets does not exceed AU$248 million (calendar year 2013). Id. at
s 13A(4)(b)(ii); Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulations 1989 (Cth) reg 5(2) (Austl.).
88. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 19(2) (Austl.).
89. Id. at s 7(1). The holding of a mineral right is such a business. Id. at s 7(2).
90. Id. at s 19(7).
91. The Act also applies to acquisition of interests in Australian urban land. Id. at s 21A. However, this Article is focused on the regulation of investment in corporations.
92. Id. at s 20(2).
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The second situation arises when the following occurs:93
 An arrangement is to be entered into or terminated in relation to
an Australian business carried on solely by prescribed corporations. For these purposes, an arrangement means leasing, hiring, or the granting of rights to use or, more importantly, participate in profits or management.
 As a result, the business would be controlled by foreign persons
or new foreign persons.
 The result would be contrary to the national interest.
The first situation is narrower than the second because it is premised on a foreign person being in control of a corporation, resulting in
directors of that corporation being under an obligation to that foreign
person. However, in both situations, the result must be that the corporation or business will be “controlled” by foreign persons. The Act expands
the concept of control to include circumstances in which a person and her
associates are able to determine the policy of the corporation “in relation
to any matter.”94 This provision is potentially broad enough to capture
interests, including the following: structures using convertible instruments; economic only interests; or derivative or swap positions in Australian or offshore entities with Australian assets, if that interest gives a
foreign person or persons the ability to determine the policy of a corporation in relation to any matter.
C. Applications Under the Act
If a foreign person is required to obtain prior approval under the
Act or if they wish to make an application under the Act so that the
Treasurer’s powers are deactivated, then the applicant must provide
FIRB with specified information about the company, the target, and the
transaction. Once notification of the proposed transaction has been
lodged, the Treasurer has thirty days to make a decision and ten days to
notify the applicant of that decision.95 If the applicant has not proceeded
with the transaction and the Treasurer does not give any notification
within that time, the Treasurer ceases to have power with respect to that
proposal.96 However, the Treasurer may provide an interim order if more
93. Id. at s 21(2).
94. Id. at ss 20(5)(a), 21(5)(a) (emphasis added). These provisions were inserted in the Act in
2010.
95. Id. at ss 24, 25(1B), 25(2).
96. Id. at s 25(2).
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time is required to allow due consideration of the application.97 An interim order prohibits the applicant from proceeding with the proposal for a
period of up to ninety days, after which the Treasurer has a period of ten
days in which to notify the applicant of the decision.98
D. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy
The Policy imposes additional restrictions on investments by foreign persons in a limited number of sensitive sectors (such as banking,
civil aviation, telecommunication, airports, airlines, shipping, and media)
as well as investments by foreign governments and their agencies. The
Policy has no legislative force, but adherence to its requirements is
achieved in practice by a number of means, such as the possibility of refusal to grant necessary ministerial (or other) approvals under other Australian law and the prospect of ongoing resistance from the Australian
government to the relevant investor’s activities, including the likelihood
that future applications under the Act might be refused.
Thus, the Policy imposes additional obligations upon SWFs and
SOEs. These obligations are in addition to those imposed by the Act.
Applications under the Policy are not governed by the statutory processes
set forth in the Act, and therefore, the government is not required to respond to applications arising under the Policy within pre-defined time
constraints. Under this regime, applications by Chinese SOEs in 2008–
2009 were under review for prolonged periods, which in some circumstances proved commercially significant.99
Any “direct investment” by “foreign government investors,” irrespective of size, requires notification for prior approval. These applications are addressed on a case-by-case basis.100 On February 17, 2008, the
Australian Treasurer released a set of additional Guidelines for Foreign
Government Investment Proposals,101 which purported to “enhance the
transparency of Australia’s foreign investment screening regime” in the
areas of SWFs and SOEs. The Treasurer suggested that these new Guidelines did not reflect a new development.102 However, many commenta97. Id. at s 22(1).
98. Id. at ss 22(2), 24.
99. See infra Part V.
100. See Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, supra note 56, at 2, 14–15.
101. Wayne Swan, ‘Government Improves Transparency of Foreign Investment Screening
Process’ (Media Release, No. 009, Feb. 17 2008) (Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.a
u/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/009.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType.
102. In a speech to the Australia–China Business Council in Melbourne on July 4, 2008, the
Treasurer made the following comments in relation to the Guidelines: “These guidelines were those
used by the previous government; they are what we use too. They are not new. . . .” Wayne Swan,
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tors argued that the release of these Guidelines indicated an overall shift
in the government’s approach to FDI, primarily directed at investment by
Chinese SOEs.103
In understanding the potential scope of the pre-approval requirement for investments by SWFs and SOEs, it is necessary to consider
which investors would be considered a foreign government investor and
what is meant by direct investment. These terms are defined very broadly
and ambiguously in the Policy and reflect the Australian government’s
experience in seeking to regulate these types of transactions in recent
years.
For the purposes of the Policy, a foreign government investor is
considered by FIRB to be an entity in which a foreign government or its
agencies have an interest of 15% or more; foreign governments or their
agencies have an aggregate interest of 40% or more; or it is otherwise
controlled by foreign governments or their agencies, or could be controlled by them as part of a controlling group.104 Experience suggests that
in the current political environment, the Australian government would
take a broad view of what constitutes a foreign government agency and
would instead look at practical decision-making processes and other indicia of control rather than just focus on the ownership structure of a particular entity.105 For example, the global financial crisis saw a succession
of government-sponsored financial bailouts of some of the largest corporate enterprises in the world. All global companies and financial institutions that have had a more than 15% capital injection from a government
or SWF are treated as an SOE under Australia’s regulatory framework.
A direct investment is considered by FIRB to be an investment that
provides the investor with potential influence or control over the target.

Treasurer, Austl., China and This Asian Century, Speech Delivered at the Australia–China Business
Council (July 4, 2008), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeche
s/2008/021.htm&pageID=005&min=wms&Year=2008&DocType=1.
103. The Treasurer said at the time,
You will have heard, as I have, a couple of arguments about our approach to Chinese investment—broadly, that we have changed our policy to a more restrictive stance, and furthermore, are slowing down the processing of Chinese applications. I don’t think either of
these stand up when considered against the facts. I have approved a Chinese investment
proposal on average once every nine days since coming into office. This is certainly not a
slowing pace.
Id. However, it would seem that the Guidelines were issued shortly after the initial Chinalco investment in Rio Tinto, described infra Part V.B, with further Chinese SOE investments announced
around that time. See Larum & Qian, supra note 43, at 10.
104. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, supra note 56, at 17.
105. The Policy states that foreign government investors should notify the government for
review if they have any doubt as to whether an investment is notifiable. Id. at 2.

2014]

Foreign Direct Investment by State Controlled Entities

553

Any investment of an interest of 10% or more in an entity is considered a
direct investment. An interest of less than 10% may be considered a direct investment if the investor is building a strategic state or can use the
investment to influence or control the target. If the investment includes
special or veto rights, director appointment rights, is related to contractual arrangements (such as loan, service, or off take arrangements), or if it
involves the building or maintaining of a strategic or long-term relationship with the target, the investment will be considered a direct investment.106
The Guidelines promulgated in 2008 have now been absorbed into
the Policy.107 The primary area of focus for the Australian government
will be to assess whether the investment is commercial in nature or
whether the investor may be pursuing broader political or strategic objectives. This includes assessing whether the governance arrangements
could facilitate actual or potential government control, including through
funding arrangements. Where there are minority investors in the foreign
government investor, the size, nature, and composition of that minority
will be considered.
Mitigating factors that the Australian government will consider are
external partners or shareholders in the investment, the level of nonassociated investment, the governance arrangement, ongoing arrangements to protect Australian interests from non-commercial dealings, and
whether the target will remain listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) or another exchange. The Australian government will also
consider the size, importance, and potential impact of the investment.
E. Industry-Based Restrictions
In addition to the review process imposed under the Act and the
Policy, Australian legislation restricts foreign ownership in a limited
range of sensitive industries, including shipping, aviation, airports, banking, and gaming.108 There are also specific restrictions relating to foreign
ownership of Qantas and Telstra.109 Any investment by foreign persons

106. Holding an interest of less than 10% following enforcement of a security interest is also
considered a direct investment. Id. at 14.
107. Id. at 2 (section titled “Foreign Government Investors”).
108. For examples of these types of legislation, see Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth) s 12
(Austl.); Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth) s 11A(2) (Austl.); Airports Act 1996 (Cth) s 40 (Austl.);
Banking Act 1959 (Cth) s 9(2) (Austl.); Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act 1998 (Cth) s 10
(Austl.); and the Casino Control Acts and the analogous legislation of each Australian state.
109. Qantas Sale Act 1992 (Cth) s 7(1)(a) (Austl.); Telstra Corporation Act 1991 (Cth) s 8BD
(Austl.).
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in these circumstances requires specific consideration under the relevant
legislation.
V. CHINESE SOE INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA
In the period following 2008, there were a number of significant
FDI proposals by Chinese SOEs in Australia, particularly in the resources sector. The case studies in that period, described below, illustrate
the journey the Australian government has embarked upon in grappling
with the issues associated with SOE and SWF investment in Australia.
The Australian experience during this time was tumultuous. The initial wave of resources investment by Chinese SOEs in early 2008 left
the new Labor government ill-prepared for the policy issues arising from
SOE investment.110 While not considerable in total numbers, a perceived
onslaught of resource-related Chinese proposals in early 2009 resulted in
a logjam of applications. Delays arose in processing those applications.
While no application was formally rejected, significant pressures nonetheless arose on all sides in the processing of the applications.111 Since
then, there has been greater predictability of the likely terms for approval
of SOE investment. However, the conditions of approval for the higher
profile proposals remain harsh.112

110. David Uren, Chinalco’s Rio Raid Rattled the Government, AUSTRALIAN (June 4, 2012),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/business/chinalcos-rio-raid-rattled-the-government/storyfn8sc6jr-1226381969530#.
111. The Oz Minerals initial proposal would have been rejected, leading to a revised proposal
that was accepted. China’s Minmetals Revises Bid for Oz Minerals, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar.
31, 2009, 6:53 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/chinas-minmetals-revises-bid-for-ozminerals/?_r=0. The second Chinalco proposal was commercially terminated in a circumstance
where the government’s final position was unknown (this was the largest ever FDI proposal made by
a Chinese SOE, where the political stakes of a government rejection would likely have been very
high). David Barboza & Michael Wines, Mining Giant Scraps China Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/business/global/05mine.html. The Lynas proposal was
commercially terminated when the government’s proposed conditions were not considered commercially acceptable by the Chinese investor. Matthew Murphy. China Quits Rare Deal with Lynas,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au/business/china-quits-raredeal-with-lynas-20090924-g4re.html.
112. E.g., Nick Sherry, ‘Foreign Investment Proposal: Yanzhou Coal Mining Company Limited Acquisition of Felix Resources Limited’ (Media Release, No. 081, Aug. 31, 2012) (Austl.)
[hereinafter Yanzhou Conditions], available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?do
c=pressreleases/2009/081.htm&pageID=003&min=njsa&Year=2009&DocType=0; Wayne Swan,
‘Foreign Investment Decision: Shandong RuYi Scientific & Technological Group Co. Ltd. and
Lempriere Pty. Ltd. Acquisition of the Assets of Cubbie Group Limited’ (Media Release, No. 079,
Aug. 31, 2012) (Austl.) [hereinafter Cubbie Conditions], available at http://ministers.treasury.
gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2012/079.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&Doc
Type=0.
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A. Key Areas of Focus When Assessing Investments by SWFs and SOEs
Several key considerations for Australian governmental approval of
FDI by SWFs and SOEs (and, in particular, investments by Chinese
SOEs) can be summarized from the case studies reviewed below. Those
considerations are as follows:
 Consideration of the resource in question (or other industry in
which the investment is proposed) to ascertain the dynamics of
how price and supply are determined so as to ensure that pricing and supply will continue to be market-based;113
 Sensitivity to national security issues (real or perceived);114
 Diversity of ownership of Australian assets in the relevant industry sector;115
 Assets to be developed according to market-based principles;116
 Possible need for majority or substantial minority local ownership;117
 Commitment to sell down over medium term in appropriate
cases to allow market-based ownership.118
 Majority or substantial Australian-resident independent board
members;119

113. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision: Minmetals Resources Limited Acquisition of Album Resources Private Limited’ (Media Release, No. 093, Dec. 19, 2010) (Austl.) [hereinafter Minmetals Conditions], available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=
pressreleases/2010/093.htm&page ID=003&min=wms&Year=2010&DocType=0; Yanzhou Conditions supra note 112; Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112.
114. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment: China Minmetals Non-Ferrous Metals Co. Ltd—
Proposed Acquisition of OZ Minerals Ltd.’ (Media Release, No. 029, Mar. 27, 2009) (Austl.) [hereinafter Original Minmetals Decision], available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.asp
x?doc=pressreleases/2009/029.htm&page ID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType=0.
115. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Approval: Sinosteel’s Interest in Murchison
Metals Ltd. (Media Release, No. 100, Sept. 21, 2008) (Austl.) [hereinafter Sinosteel Decision],
available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/100.htm&
pageID=003&min=wms&Year=2008&DocType=0.
116. E.g., Minmetals Conditions, supra note 113; Peter Costello, ‘Foreign Investment Proposal—Shell Australia Investments Limited’s Acquisition of Woodside Petroleum Limited (Media
Release, No. 025, Apr. 23, 2001) (Austl.) [hereinafter Shell Rejection], available at http://ministers.
treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.
aspx?doc=pressreleases/2001/025.htm&pageID=003&min=phc&Year=2001&DocType=0.
117. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Chinalco’s Acquisition of Share in Rio Tinto’ (Media Release, No.
094, Aug. 24, 2008) (Austl.) [hereinafter Chinalco Decision], available at http://ministers.treasury.
gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/094.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=2008&
DocType=0; Sinosteel Decision, supra note 115; Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112; Murphy, supra
note 111.
118. E.g., Yanzhou Conditions, supra note 112; Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112.
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Australian headquarters and management in appropriate cases;120 and
Possible need to create information barriers to prevent
nominee–director access to pricing information.121
B. Experience in Recent Years

Date Transaction
2008 Target: February 1, 2008: Acquisition by Chinalco122 of a 9% shareholding in Rio
Tinto Group123 for $12 billion by open market purchase.
Application Status: August 24, 2008: Acquisition approved.124
Undertakings were given that prohibited the company from increase shareholding without further approval and from seeking to appoint director while shareholding is below 15%.
2008 Target: Possible reverse takeover of Murchison Metals Ltd. (iron ore exploration
company) by Sinosteel125 seeking to acquire 100% of Midwest Corp. by takeover
offer announced March 14, 2008, and Murchison Metals Ltd. (iron ore exploration

119. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision: Hunan Valin Iron and Steel Group—
Acquisition of up to a 17.55 Percent Interest in Fortescue Metals Group (Media Release, No. 032,
Mar. 31, 2009) (Austl.) [hereinafter Hunan Valin Conditions], available at http://ministers.treasury.
gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2009/032.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&Doc
Type=0; Yanzhou Conditions, supra note 112.
120. E.g., Minmetals Conditions, supra note 113;Yanzhou Conditions, supra note 112; Cubbie
Conditions, supra note 112.
121. E.g., Hunan Valin Conditions, supra note 119.
122. Chinalco is a Chinese SOE 100% owned by the Chinese people. Overview, CHINALCO,
http://www.chalco.com.cn/zl/web/chinalco_en_show.jsp?ColumnID=122 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013)
(China).
123. Rio Tinto PLC is a company incorporated in England and listed on the London Stock
Exchange as the English arm of the dual-listed Rio Tinto Group. Group Overview, RIO TINTO,
http://www.riotinto.com/aboutus/group-overview-5231.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (U.K.). The
Australian arm of the Rio Tinto Group is Rio Tinto Ltd., a company incorporated in Australia with
its primary listing on the ASX. Id. By virtue of the dual listing arrangements, the two Rio Tinto
listed entities are intended to operate and be managed as a single economic unit. Id. Chinalco’s 12%
shareholding in Rio Tinto PLC equated to an approximate 9% economic interest in the Rio Tinto
Group, and it was reported Chinalco received had legal advice that it did not require prior approval
for an investment in Rio Tinto PLC up to 14.9% because it was acquiring shares in a company incorporated in England and listed on the London Stock Exchange. Uren, supra note 110.
124. Wayne Swan, ‘Chinalco’s Acquisition of Shares in Rio Tinto’ (Media Release, No. 094,
Aug. 24, 2008) (Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=press
releases/2008/094.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=2008&DocType=0.
125. Sinosteel is a Chinese SOE that is 100% owned by the Chinese people. See About Sinosteel, SINOSTEEL, http://en.sinosteel.com/zggk/jtjj/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China).
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Date

Transaction
company) seeking to acquire 100% of Midwest Corp. by scrip scheme of arrangement announced May, 26, 2008.126 Sinosteel acquired 100% of Midwest. Both
Murchison Metals and Midwest were seeking to develop the Midwest iron ore region of Western Australia together with the infrastructure required for that development. The Murchison transaction did not proceed.
Application Status: Midwest acquisition approval given.127
Interim orders made on Murchison transaction.128 Approval to acquire up to
49.9% of the shares in Murchison with no approval given for a higher shareholding
in the interests of “diversity of ownership” of iron ore in the Midwest region.129
2009 Target: On February 12, 2009, Rio Tinto Group announced that it had entered into a
Co-operation and Implementation Agreement with Chinalco for a further proposed
US$19.5 billion strategic partnership. The proposed transaction involved the investment by Chinalco of US$7.2 billion through convertible bonds as well as a
US$12.3 billion investment in certain Rio Tinto assets.
On June 24, 2009, Rio Tinto Group announced that it had terminated the Cooperation and Implementation Agreement with Chinalco and instead would pursue
an AU$15 billion rights issue at £14 per share and joint venture with BHP in relation to its iron ore assets in the Pilbara region.
Application Status: Interim order.130 No decision reached.

126. If Murchison acquired Midwest when Sinosteel controlled Midwest, Sinosteel would then
control Murchison.
127. Sinosteel obtained unconditional FIRB approval to make the takeover bid at the time it
sought clearance for its initial investment in January 2008. Tim Lee Master, Sinosteel Taps Midwest’s Minority Investors in Pursuit of 20pc Stake, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 25, 2008),
http://www.scmp.com/article/624211/sinosteel-taps-midwests-minority-investors-pursuit-20pcstake.
128. On June 25, 2008, an interim order dated June 16, 2008, was published in the Commonwealth Gazette prohibiting Sinosteel from acquiring a substantial shareholding in or assets of Murchison Metals Ltd. Commonwealth, Gazette, Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975: Order
Under Subsection 22(1), No. 25, June 25, 2008, 1858 (Austl.), available at http://www.com
law.gov.au/file/2008GN25.
129. Sinosteel Decision, supra note 115. The media release noted that Sinosteel’s application
to acquire up to 100% of Murchison had been withdrawn and that a revised application for up to
49.9% of Murchison was approved:
In approving Sinosteel’s application, I have determined that a shareholding of up to 49.9
percent in Murchison will maintain diversity of ownership within the Mid West region.
The Government considers the development of such potentially significant new resource
areas should occur through arrangements that are open to multiple investors. This approach is consistent with the national interest principles we released in February and with
the approach I have outlined previously, including in discussions with my Chinese counterparts.
Id.
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Date Transaction
2009 Target: Proposal by China Minmetals Non-Ferrous Metals Co.131 on February 16,
2009, to acquire 100% shareholding in OZ Minerals Ltd. (diversified mining company) by cash scheme. OZ Minerals had been struggling financially following the
collapse of commodity markets in 2008 and had been unable to complete the sale of
various assets, which it had hoped would allow it meet a AU$1.3 billion debt repayment due on March 31, 2009.
Application Status: Revised proposal to acquire most of the assets of OZ Minerals
on April 1, 2009 by asset sale for AU$1.2 billion.
Interim order issued.132 Initial proposal would not have been approved if it included the Prominent Hill site on national security grounds.133
Revised proposal approved April 29, 2009, with undertakings that required the
acquiring company to do the following:134
- operate the assets as a separate business unit according to commercial objectives, including the maximization of product prices and long-term profitability and value;
- own the Australian assets through companies incorporated, headquartered,

130. On March 23, 2009, FIRB issued an Interim Order extending the period of consideration
of the proposal by up to 90 days. Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No. S 48, March 24, 2009, 1
[hereinafter Gazette: Special], available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/file/2009GN12.
131. Minmetals is a Chinese SOE controlled by China Minmetals Corporation as a 90% shareholder (which is wholly owned by the Chinese government). About Us, CHINA MINMETALS NONFERROUS METALS CO., http://cmnltd.minmetals.com.cn/article.do?method=gettop&version= english&column_no=2103 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013); Central SOEs, SASAC, http://www.sasac.
gov.cn/n2963340/n2971121/n4956567/4956583.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China).
132. On March 23, 2009, FIRB issued an interim order extending the period for evaluation of
Minmetal’s application by 90 days. Gazette: Special, supra note 130.
133. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment’ (Media Release, No. 029, Mar. 27, 2009) (Austl.),
available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2009/029.htm&
pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType=0.
Under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975, all foreign investment applications are examined against Australia’s national interest. An important part of this assessment is whether proposals conform with Australia’s national security interests, in line
with the principles that apply to foreign government related investments. OZ Minerals’
Prominent Hill mining operations are situated in the Woomera Prohibited Area in South
Australia. The Woomera Prohibited Area weapons testing range makes a unique and sensitive contribution to Australia’s national defence [sic]. It is not unusual for governments
to restrict access to sensitive areas on national security grounds. The [g]overnment has
determined that Minmetals’ proposal for OZ Minerals cannot be approved if it includes
Prominent Hill. . . . Discussions between the Foreign Investment Review Board and
Minmetals are continuing in relation to OZ Minerals’ other businesses and assets . . .
Id.
134. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision: Approval for Revised Application by China
Minmetals Non-Ferrous Metals Co. Ltd. of OZ Minerals Ltd.’ (Media Release, No. 043, Apr. 23,
2009) (Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/
2009/043.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType=0.
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Transaction
and managed in Australia under a predominantly Australian management
team;
comply with financial reporting requirements under the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth);
- sell products produced on arms-length terms by a sales team headquartered
in Australia, with pricing being determined by reference to international
observable benchmarks and in line with market practice;
- continue to operate certain assets at current or increased production and
employment levels
- pursue the growth of certain projects and comply with Australian industrial
relations laws
- honor employee entitlements and support indigenous Australian communities
2009 Target: Acquisition by Hunan Valin Iron and Steel Group Co.135 of a 17.4% shareholding in Fortescue Metals Mining Group Ltd. (iron ore mining company). Joint
venture to develop certain iron ore tenements and off-take arrangement valued at
AU$650 million announced February 25, 2009.
Application Status: Interim order issued.136Approval given March 31, 2009, on the
basis of undertakings that include the following:137
- any person nominated by Hunan Valin to Fortescue’s Board will comply
with the Director’s Code of Conduct maintained by Fortescue;
- any person nominated by Hunan Valin to Fortescue’s Board will submit a
standing notice under the Corporations Act of their potential conflict of interest relating to Fortescue’s marketing, sales, customer profiles, price setting, and cost structures for pricing and shipping;
- Hunan Valin and any person nominated by it to Fortescue’s Board will
comply with the information segregation arrangements agreed between
Fortescue and Hunan Valin;
- Hunan Valin must report to FIRB on its compliance with the undertakings
with penalties payable for non-compliance.

135. Hunan Valin is a Chinese SOE 100% owned by the Hunan provincial government. Hunan
Valin Iron and Steel Group Co., Ltd., HUNANGOV, http://www.enghunan.gov.cn/Business/Enterpr
isesShowList/201005/t20100513_299307.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China).
136. FIRB issued an interim order on March 18, 2009, extending the FIRB review period of the
proposed transaction for up to 30 days. Commonwealth, Gazette, Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 Order Under Subsection 22(1), No. 11, March 25, 2009, 794 (Austl.), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/file/2009GN11.
137. Hunan Valin Conditions, supra note 119.
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Date Transaction
2009 Target: Proposed investment by China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Group (CNMC)
in Lynas Corp. through heads of agreement dated May 1, 2009, for CNMC to become a 51.6% shareholder in Lynas at AU$0.36 per share and facilitate the arranging of bank debt in a transaction valued at over AU$500 million. The investment
would have permitted Lynas to complete and commission a rare earths project.
On September 24, 2009, Lynas announced that CNMC had terminated the heads of
agreement.
Application Status: Interim orders issued.138 No FIRB approval at the time the
transaction was terminated.
2009 Target: Acquisition by Yanzhou Coal Mining Co.139 of 100% of Felix Resources
Limited (coal mining company) for a cash amount and shares in a subsidiary of Felix valued at approximately AU$3 billion announced August 13, 2009.
Application Status: Application was re-lodged.140
Approval given October 26, 2009, on the basis of undertakings that include
the following:141
- Felix and Yanzhou’s other Australian assets to be owned by an Australian
holding company headquartered and managed in Australia by a predominately Australian management and sales team with the following:
- the Australian holding company and its operating subsidiaries having at
least two Australian resident directors, one to be independent of Yanzhou;
- all future Australian operations to be owned by the Australian holding
company;

138. On July 8, 2009, Lynas announced that FIRB had asked CNMC to resubmit its application. CNMC Transaction Update, LYNAS CORP. (July 8, 2009), http://www.lynascorp.com/Announc
ements/2009/CNMC_Transaction_Update_8_July_2009_739157.pdf (Austl.). On August 3, 2009,
Lynas announced that FIRB had yet not made a decision and that the thirty-day period for FIRB
review would now expire in early September 2009. CNMC Transaction Update, LYNAS CORP.,
(Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.lynascorp.com/Announcements/2009/CNMC_Transaction_Update_3_
August_2009_V2_747294.pdf (Austl.). On September 2, 2009, Lynas announced that FIRB had not
yet made a decision and that the thirty-day period for FIRB review would now expire in early October 2009. CNMC Transaction Update, LYNAS CORP., (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.lynascorp.com/
Announcements/2009/CNMC_Transaction_Update_2_September_2009_758500.pdf (Austl.). It
follows that CNMC withdrew and re-submitted its application three times. By then, five months had
passed.
139. Yanzhou is a Chinese company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, New York
Stock Exchange, and Shanghai Stock Exchange. Yankuang Group Corporation holds approximately
53% of Yanzhou which is ultimately controlled by the Shandong Provincial Government. Company
Overview, YANZHOU COAL MINING CO., http://www.yanzhoucoal.com.cn/en/text/2009-11/10/con
tent_88347.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China); About Us, YANKUANG GROUP, http://www.yan
kuanggroup.com.cn/node_6387.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China).
140. FIRB consideration of the proposal required the application to be re-lodged once to reactivate the thirty-day review period.
141. Yanzhou Conditions, supra note 112.
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Transaction
- the chief executive officer and chief financial officer to have a principal
place of residence in Australia; and
- the majority of board meetings to take place Australia.
The Australian holding company must be operated in accordance with commercial objectives, including maximization of product prices, long-term profitability and value with production sold at an arms-length, and a non-discriminatory basis to all customers at prices determined by reference to international benchmarks in
line with market practice. The requirements for the Australian holding company
included the following:
- Seek to list on ASX by no later than the end of 2010;
- Yanzhou’s economic ownership of the Australian holding company to be
less than 70% and of Felix’s existing assets to be less than 50% (there are
joint venture arrangements in relation to those assets).
- The chief executive officer of the Australian holding company must report
to FIRB on compliance with the undertakings at least annually.
2011 Target: Acquisition by Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. of 100% of Gloucestor Coal Ltd.
(coal mining company) by Yancoal Australia by the issue of scrip in Yancoal Australia and cash return valued at approximately AU$2.2 billion announced in December 2011. Gloucester shareholders received shares representing 23% of the enlarged bidder.
Application Status: Approval given March 8, 2012, subject to undertakings that
included the following:142
- Felix conditions to continue with following amendments;
- Yancoal to list on ASX by end 2012 and Yanzhou’s ownership to be less
than 70% by end 2013;
- Reduce economic ownership in Syntech Resources and Premier Coal to
70% by the end of 2014 and manage these mines through Yancoal in the interim.

142. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision: Yancoal Australia Limited’s Merger with
Gloucester Coal Limited Approved’ (Media Release, No. 009, Mar. 8, 2012) (Austl.), available at
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2012/009.htm&pageID=003&
min=wms&Year=&DocType=0.
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Date Transaction
2012 Target: Consortium acquisition by Shandong RuYi Scientific & Technological
Group Co.143 with Lempriere Pty. Ltd. (an Australian investor) of the assets of
Cubbie Group for an undisclosed price.144
Application Status: Approval given August 31, 2012, subject to undertakings:145
- RuYi to sell down interest from 80% to 51% to independent parties within
3 years and ensure board representation is proportionate to its shareholding;
- Cubbie to be managed by Lempriere and sell cotton at arms-length terms;
- comply with law and offer to employ existing employees; and
- investigate ways to improve water efficiency and sell surplus water allocations.
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH SOME OTHER KEY JURISDICTIONS
The fact that Australia has grappled with the issue of FDI by SWFs
and SOEs in recent years is not unique to western nations. The extent of
regulation of FDI has been a growing issue in many jurisdictions over the
last decade for the reasons advanced in the introduction. This Part considers comparative analysis and case studies from some other similarly
developed Western countries.
Many jurisdictions, including a number of European countries, do
not have a general statutory regime for regulating FDI but instead rely on
more opaque general arrangements, such as the following:146
1. Sectoral restrictions on foreign ownership in various key industries;
2. Opaque regulatory approval requirements that apply to any control transaction in various key industries but where foreign
ownership is discouraged as a practical matter in decision making;

143. A leading Chinese textile manufacturer owned by Chinese and Japanese investors. About
Us, SHANDONG RU YI GROUP, http://www.chinaruyi.com/doce/about/about.asp (last visited Oct. 24,
2013) (China).
144. Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112. Cubbie Group owns substantial agricultural load in
Southern Queensland and is involved in a variety of irrigated agricultural activities including the
production of significant amounts of cotton. About Cubbie Ag, CUBBIE, http://www.cubbie.com.
au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=61 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013)
(Austl.); Our Production, CUBBIE, http://www.cubbie.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&ta
sk=view&id=13&Itemid=45 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (Austl.).
145. Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112.
146. For a detailed analysis of these factors and case studies, see ANDREA MANDELCAMPBELL, CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGIMES: HOW CANADA STACKS UP
ch. 2 (2008), available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/abstract.aspx?did=2531.
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3. Golden shares and unequal voting right mechanisms in corporate governance structures; and
4. Political meddling in merger and acquisition transactions where
political support is provided to local bidders to contest control
proposals made by foreign bidders.
The OECD measures the restrictiveness of national regimes for
regulating inwards foreign direct investment and currently ranks Australia as the thirteenth most restrictive regime out of the more than forty-four
countries surveyed, which included both member and some non-member
states.147 If Australia were to abolish its screening processes, it has been
suggested that Australia would be ranked towards the middle of OECD
countries on these measures.148
The OECD restrictiveness index does not seem to give a fair representation of Australia’s relative position in regulating FDI. Pre-screening
is not itself a significant impediment to FDI if the approval process is
timely, transparent, and predictable. That would not always seem to be
the case in jurisdictions that do not have a general foreign investment
approval regime.
A. United States of America
Foreign investment in the United States is regulated by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).149 The man-

147. Blanka Kalinova et al., OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index: 2010 Update 18 (OECD
Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Paper No. 2010/03, 2010) (Fr.), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/
inv/investmentfordevelopment/45563285.pdf. An earlier survey had ranked Australia as the sixth
most restrictive regime. OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 2007: FREEDOM OF
INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 140 (2007), available at http://www.keepeek.com/DigitalAsset-Management/oecd/finance-and-investment/international-investment-perspectives-2007_iip2007-en.
148. See Sinclair Davidson et al., Submission to the Senate Inquiry into Investment by StateOwned Enterprises, INST. PUB. AFFAIRS, 10 (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_
Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed%20inquiries/2008-10/firb_09/submissions/~
/media/wopapub/senate/committee/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2008_10/firb_09/submissio
ns/sub32_pdf.ashx (Austl.).
149. CFIUS is an interagency committee that works for the President . JAMES K. JACKSON,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2013). CFIUS was initially established in 1975 by Presidential Executive Order. Id. The
current CFIUS process arises from the 1988 “Exon–Florio” provision of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act, id. at 3–5, as amended in 1992 by the Byrd Amendment of the National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 1993, id., and in 2007 by the National Security Foreign Investment Reform
and Strengthened Transparency Act. Id. at 7–8. The CFIUS regime is contained in section 721 of the
Defense Production Act. Defense Production Act of 1950 § 721, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2012).
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date of CFIUS is to review the national security implications of foreign
investment.150 In this context “national security” extends to “critical infrastructure”151 and “critical technologies.”152 As such, the scope of the
regime is narrower than the national interest criteria of Australia.
A CFIUS review can be initiated by a voluntary filing by the President or by CFIUS.153 The advantage of a voluntary filing is the expectation that once a transaction is approved, it will be exempt from further
review or action.154 The legislation applies to any “covered transaction,”
meaning a merger, acquisition, or takeover that could result in a foreign
person controlling an entity engaged in interstate commerce in the United
States.155
Importantly, in the context of SWFs and SOEs, a review must be
undertaken if the transaction involves an entity that is a foreign government or one that is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government.
When a CFIUS review is initiated, CFIUS has thirty days to review
the transaction to determine its effects on the national security of the
United States.156 If the review results in a determination that the transaction threatens to impair national security and that threat has not yet been
mitigated, CFIUS must conduct an investigation of the effects of the
transaction within forty-five days and take any necessary actions to protect national security.157 After conducting that investigation, CFIUS must
submit a report to Congress on the results of the investigation or submit
the matter to the President for decision.158 The President has authority to
take action within fifteen days to prohibit the transaction for such time as

150. CFIUS consists of nine members—the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Homeland
Security, Commerce and Energy, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and
the Director of the Office of Science and Technology. The Secretary of Labor and Director of National Security are ex officio members. JACKSON, supra note 149, at 8 n.31.
151. Critical infrastructure means systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital that their
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security. 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 2170(a)(6).
152. The definition of critical technologies includes critical technology, critical components, or
critical technology essential to national security. Id. § 2170(a)(7).
153. Id. § 2170(b)(1)(C)–(D).
154. The legislation allows CFIUS to reopen a review if the person materially fails to comply
with an arrangement entered into in relation to an approval or has provided false or misleading material information. Id. § 2170(b)(1)(D)(ii).
155. Id. § 2170(a)(3). Control is defined in the Treasury Department regulations as a majority
or dominant minority of voting securities, or the power to determine or decide certain specified
decisions. 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a) (2008).
156. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(b)(1)(E).
157. Id. § 2170(b)(2)(A),(C).
158. Id. § 2170(b)(3)(B).
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he considers appropriate if he finds credible evidence that a foreign controlling interest might take action that threatens national security.159 The
CFIUS Act lists a variety of factors that the President may take into account when considering national security, including the following:160
 Domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements;
 Capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements;
 Potential effects on sale of military materials to countries of
concern;
 Effects on critical infrastructure or critical technologies; and
 Whether it is a foreign government controlled transaction.
As a result of the rigidity of the thirty-forty-five-fifteen-day process, CFIUS has developed a practice of allowing an informal preliminary stage of consultancy of unspecified length. This allows for additional time to resolve concerns and confidentiality protections, particularly if
a transaction would otherwise be publicly prohibited.161
The number of transactions subject to CFIUS review is significantly less than transactions subject to FIRB review, especially so considering the significantly smaller size of the Australian economy and mergers
and acquisitions market. The most noteworthy recent development is the
2012 presidential rejection of the Sany wind farm investment (see below). Some broad statistics concerning the results of CFIUS review in
recent years are as follows:
Foreign Investment Transactions Reviewed by CFIUS, 2008–2010162
Year
2008
2009
2010
Total

Number of Notices Withdrawn Number of Notices Withdrawn Presidential
Notices
During Review Investigations During Investigation Decisions
155
18
23
5
0
65
5
25
2
0
93
6
35
6
0
313
29
93
13
0

159. Id. § 2170(d)(1)–(2).
160. Id. § 2170(f).
161. See JACKSON, supra note 149, at 7–8.
162. COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR
CY 2010, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreigninvestment/Documents/2011%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL%20PUBLIC.pdf.
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Some of the more contentious decisions made in connection with
the CFIUS regime in recent years include the following:
Date
2000

Transaction
Acquisition by NTT Communications (Japan) of Verio Inc. (firm providing internet services) for US$5.5 billion. The transaction was approved by CFIUS. NTT
was controlled by the Japanese government. CFIUS review was instigated by the
FBI who was concerned NTT could access information on U.S. government wiretaps.163
2005 Proposed acquisition by CNOOC (Chinese SOE) of Unocal (oil producer) for
US$18.5 billion. The proposal was withdrawn after the House of Representatives
approved a provision that would have delayed the transaction and because of a
likely CFIUS investigation.
2005/ Proposed acquisition of commercial port operations by Dubai Ports World (an Arab
2006 SOE entity) from P&O for approximately US$6.7 billion. The transaction was approved by CFIUS without undertaking a forty-five day investigation.164 As a result
of vocal criticism from members of Congress and the public, DPW disposed of the
U.S. ports to AIG Global Investment Group (a U.S. asset manager) in 2006.165
2006 Acquisition by Check Point Software Corp. (Israel) of Sourcefire, a specialist in
security appliances for computer networks, for US$225 million. The transaction
was terminated following CFIUS concerns.166
2008 Proposed acquisition by Bain Capital and Huawei (China telecommunications
company) of 3Com, a network and software provider, for US$2.2 billion. The
transaction did not proceed after failure to negotiate a mitigation agreement with
CFIUS. Certain 3Com software is used to protect the confidentiality of databases
used by U.S. defense forces.167
2009 Proposed investment by Northwest Non-Ferrous International Investment Co. to
acquire 50.1% interest in First Gold Corp. for US$26 million. The proposal was
withdrawn when CFIUS advised it would recommend the investment be blocked.
First Gold was a junior mining company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange
(incorporated in the United States) that was seeking to develop gold mines adjacent to U.S. military installations in Nevada. The rejection was based on national
security concerns.

163. JACKSON, supra note 149, at 9.
164. Id. at 25.
165. Id. at 1.
166. Id. at 9.
167. Id. at 19.
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Transaction
Proposed investment by Tangshan Caofedian Investment Corp. (China) in Emcore,
a maker of components for fibre optics and solar panels, valued at approximately
US$54 million. The transaction was terminated following CFIS concerns.168
Proposed acquisition by Huawei (Chinese telecommunications company) of server
assets of 3 Leaf (a technology company in bankruptcy) for US$2 million. The
transaction was terminated following CFIUS’s advice that it would recommend
the transaction be blocked.169
Proposed acquisition by Ralls Corp. (owned by executives of Sany of China) of
several wind farms in Oregon. In September 2012, President Barak Obama signed
an Executive Order prohibiting the acquisition, requiring the dismantling of Sany
turbines on the sites, and ordered that no purchaser of the sites be sold to Sany turbines.170
In October 2012, Sany commenced proceedings before the District Court of Columbia, challenging the President’s decision on the basis that it exceeded his powers under the CFIUS legislation, particularly in requiring the turbines be dismantled and not sold for use at the sites and on the basis that the action discriminated
against Sany. Wind farms in the restricted air space area use turbines made by
German and Danish companies, and some are owned by an Indian conglomerate.

2013

On February 26, 2013, Judge Amy Jackson dismissed Sany’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction on the basis that the CFIUS legislative provisions exempt Presidential
actions from judicial review.171 Sany’s further complaint that due process required
a more detailed explanation of the President’s findings was not struck, and that
claim continued.172 Ralls Corp. has appealed the decision.
Acquisition by Wanxiang Group (China) of assets of A123 Systems, an electrical
battery maker, out of bankruptcy for approximately US$250 million. Approved by
CFIUS despite congressional criticism that the acquisition could jeopardize energy
security and because of the government grants A123 has received in developing its
technology.173

168. Id. at 9.
169. For details, see Ken Hu, Huawei Open Letter, HUAWEI (Feb. 25, 2011), http://pr.huawei.
com/en/news/hw-092875-huaweiopenletter.htm#.UnVr9vmkqt- (China).
170. Press Release, White House, Order Signed by the President Regarding the Acquisition of
Four US Wind Farm Projects by Ralls Corporation (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://www.whiteh
ouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/28/order-signed-president-regarding-acquisition-four-us-wind-far
m-project-c.
171. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 926 F. Supp. 2d 71, 91
(D.D.C. 2013).
172. Id. at 95.
173. JACKSON, supra note 149, at 10.
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The recent cases involving China demonstrate that CFIUS is struggling with its review of Chinese investment to an even greater degree
than is experienced in Australia.174 This was taking place at a time when
Chinese FDI into the United States had matched Australia for the first
time as the primary destination of Chinese investment in 2012.175
There currently appears to be much greater political and community
hostility to Chinese investment in the United States than there is in Australia. The vituperative tone of the House of Representatives’ Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence regarding the telecommunications activities of Huawei and ZTE of China (neither company is an SOE) and
the suggestion that their sales of computer equipment are injurious to
U.S. national security interests illustrate the level of suspicion that exists
in the United States in relation to Chinese FDI.176
B. Canada
Foreign investment is primarily regulated in Canada under the Investment Canada Act of 1985.177 Transactions that exceed certain control
(equity) and monetary thresholds are reviewable and subject to approval
by the Minister of Industry on the basis that the investment is likely to be
of “net benefit” to Canada.178 The term net benefit is not defined but,
when considered objectively, is likely to be a higher hurdle than Australia’s national interest test because of the need for the Minister to positively form that view of net benefit.179 Indeed, it is not sufficient that the investment continue the status quo; the investment must enhance the ability
of the Canadian business to achieve the factors set out in the net benefit
test.180 Of course, at the end of the day, each of these tests involves a

174. See Greg Golding, Western Regulation of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment: Sany
slapped by CFIUS, UNIV. NEW SOUTH WALES, CENTRE L., MKTS., & REGULATION (May 7, 2013),
http://clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/accountability/berle-v/western-regulation-chinese-foreign-directinvestment-sany-slapped-cfius.
175. Derek Scissors, China’s Global Investment Rises: The U.S. Should Focus on Competition,
BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington D.C.), Jan. 8, 2013, at 5, available at http://thf_med
ia.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/bg2757.pdf.
176. STAFF OF H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG.,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE (2012).
177. Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.). The author thanks Julie Soloway
of Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLC, Canada, for her comments on this section.
178. Id. § 21(1).
179. Compare the debate in Australia in 1975 when a net economic benefit test was proposed
in Part IV, supra.
180. BRIAN A. FACEY & JOSHUA A. KRANE, INVESTMENT CANADA ACT: COMMENTARY AND
ANNOTATION 54 (Lexis 2013).
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very subjective political decision-making process rather than a reviewable objective standard.
Investment Canada review applies to the acquisition of control by a
non-Canadian person of a Canadian business or the establishment of a
new business.181 Control is defined such that the acquisition of 50% or
more of voting interests in any form of business association is deemed to
be control. The acquisition of 33.3% or more—but less than 50%—of
voting shares in a Canadian corporation is presumed to be an acquisition
of control, unless there is evidence to the contrary and the acquisition of
less than 33.3 % of voting interests is deemed not to be control.182 A
threshold amount applies to reviewable transactions indexed each year;
in 2013, the threshold was C$344 for a World Trade Organization
(WTO) member.183 The general threshold is set to be increased substantially in 2013 to an enterprise value of C$600 million, rising to C$1 billion over four years, where the acquisition is made by a WTO member.184
The filing of an application for review triggers a process under
which the Minister generally has forty-five days to make a decision,185
unilaterally extendable by thirty days or longer by agreement. As the
case studies below demonstrate, a thirty-day extension following the expression of a “no net benefit” opinion has significant implications to the
implementation of a transaction: The extension may allow an opportunity
for the investor to persuade the Minister that the investment is of net
benefit. Applications are generally reviewed and administered by the
Investment Review Division of Industry Canada.186 In considering the

181. Investment Canada Act §§ 11, 14(1).
182. Id. §§ 14(2), 28(3).
183. Investment Canada Act: Amount for the Year 2013, 147 C. Gaz. pt. I 52 (Can.). Much
lower thresholds apply for direct and indirect acquisitions of control where the investor and the
entity controlling the Canadian business are not WTO investors. Investment Canada Act §§ 14(3)–
(4).
184. Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 1, S.C. 2013, c. 33, § 137 (Can.). For non-WTO
entities the threshold is C$5 million. Investment Canada Act § 14(3). A different regime applies to
SOEs. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. See generally Julie Soloway & Charles Layton,
Foreign Investment Review in Canada: Assessing Risk in the Wake of Nexen, COMPETITION POL’Y
INST. ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2013, available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/
foreign-investment-review-in-canada-assessing-risk-in-the-wake-of-nexen/.
185. Investment Canada Act § 21(1).
186. INDUSTRY CAN., INVESTMENT CANADA ACT ANNUAL REPORT 2009–2010, at 9 (2010).
However, transactions involving cultural issues are handled by the Department of Canadian Heritage. Id. at 11.
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net benefit of an acquisition, certain factors are to be taken into account
where relevant:187
1. The effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada;
2. The participation of Canadians in the business;
3. The effect on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological
development, product innovation, and variety in Canada;
4. The effect on competition in Canada;
5. The compatibility with national industrial, economic, and cultural policies; and
6. The impact on Canada’s ability to compete in world markets.
A separate regime applies to investments involving national security concerns. If the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that an investment by a non-Canadian could be injurious to national security, the
investment can be prohibited.188 In this situation, there is no monetary
threshold. The term “injurious to national security” is not defined and is
much more ambiguous in its scope compared to, for example, the CFIUS
regime.
A special regime has applied to SOE investment since 2007, with
important revisions in 2012.189 An SOE is defined as an enterprise
owned, controlled, or influenced by a foreign government. The C$
threshold for investment by SOEs is a book value of assets of C$344 million for 2013 and will remain unchanged as the general review threshold
increases. The guidelines specify that, in considering net benefit, the
Minister will consider the corporate governance and reporting structure
of the SOE, including whether the SOE adheres to Canadian standards of
corporate governance, Canadian laws, and practices and to free market
principles. Further, the Minister will assess whether the SOE will operate
on a commercial basis, including where to export, where to process, participation of Canadians in management, support for innovation, and levels of capital expenditure. SOEs are expected to give undertakings to

187. Investment Canada Act § 20.
188. Id. §§ 25.2, 25.4.
189. INDUSTRY CAN., GUIDELINES—INVESTMENT BY STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: NET
BENEFIT ASSESSMENT (2012), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.h
tml#p2. The guidelines were amended on December 7, 2012. Press Release, Industry Canada, Government of Canada Releases Policy Statement and Revised Guidelines for Investments by StateOwned Enterprises (Dec. 7, 2012), available at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=711489.
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satisfy the Minister so that the above-referenced principles will be
achieved through the investment.
The regime described above has developed against a backdrop of
public debate about the appropriate scope of regulation and the role of
FDI in shaping the Canadian economy. Canada has been particularly
anxious that key industries are being “hollowed out,” with industry
champions being acquired by foreign persons, and head offices and jobs
increasingly going offshore.190 In the hollowing out debate, Canada has
had more to fear from United States FDI than SOE investment in Canadian resources.
Some of the major transactions that have shaped this debate in Canada are as follows:
Date
2008

2009

Transaction
Proposed acquisition by Alliant Techsystems Inc. (U.S.) of space technology
division of MacDonald, Dettwiler & Associates for C$1.3 billion blocked by
the Minister.191 The basis of the decision was the loss of important technology
to Canada and a threat to Canadian surveillance of disputed arctic territory.
This was the first investment blocked under the Investment Canada Act.192
Proposed acquisition by George Forrest International of Forsys Metals Corp. (a
Namibian uranium producer) for C$585 million. The proposal was terminated
in contentious circumstances following receipt of advice from Investment Canada that GFI was prohibited from implementing the transaction pending further
notice.193

190. See MICHAEL GRANT & MICHAEL BLOOM, CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., “HOLLOWING
OUT”—MYTH AND REALITY: CORPORATE TAKEOVERS IN AN AGE OF TRANSFORMATION 1–2
(2008), available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/abstract.aspx?did=2414.
191. Press Release, Industry Canada, Minister of Industry Confirms Initial Decision on Proposed Sale of MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. to Alliant Techsystems Inc. (May 8, 2008),
available at http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=25412.
192. The investment was blocked on “net benefit” grounds and not on “national security”
grounds, see id., as the latter regime did not enter into force until 2009; however, public proceedings
following the decision confirmed that national security was the motivating factor behind the Minister’s decision. Matt Hartley, Alliant to Press Ottawa Over MDA Veto, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 14,
2008), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/alliant-to-press-ottawa-over-mda-veto/
article1054382/.
193. Press Release, Forsys Metals Corp., GFI Investment Update (Aug. 19, 2009), available at
http://forsysmetals.com/PDF/News_2009/NR%20081909.pdf. In 2011, Wikileaks released documents suggesting U.S. and Canadian diplomatic concerns that GFI may supply uranium to Iran.
Gordon Rayner, WikiLeaks: Sale of Uranium Mine Blocked over Iran Fears, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 3,
2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8299360/WikiLeaks-Sale-of-uranium
-mine-blocked-over-Iran-fears.html (U.K.).
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Transaction
Proposed acquisition by BHP Billiton of Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc.
(a significant global producer of potash) for C$43 billion. The proposal was
withdrawn following a preliminary finding by the Minister that the investment was not likely to be of net benefit and an invitation to make further
submissions to the Minister within thirty days.194 BHP had proposed various
capital expenditure commitments, Canadian employment commitments, and
community programs to satisfy the net benefit test.195
Proposed acquisition by Petronas (Malaysian SOE) of Progress Energy Resources Corp. (an oil and gas exploration and production company) for
C$5.2 billion. On October 19, 2012, the Minister advised Petronas that he
was not satisfied that the investment would likely be of net benefit and invited further submissions within 30 days.196 On Dec. 7, 2012, the Minister
advised that the investment was likely to be of net benefit.197 The Minister’s
press release indicated undertakings had been given in the areas of transparency and disclosure; adherence to free market principles and to Canadian
laws and practices; and employment and capital investments. Petronas had
previously advised that it planned to combine its Canadian business with
Progress and retain all employees of Progress.
Proposed acquisition by CNOOC Ltd. (Chinese SOE) of Nexen Ltd. (significant oil sands explorer and producer) for C$14 billion. On Dec. 7, 2012,
the Minister advised that he was satisfied that the investment would likely
of net benefit to Canada.198 The Minister’s press release indicated undertakings has been given in the areas of transparency and disclosure, adherence
to free market principles and to Canadian laws and practices; and employment and capital investments. CNOOC previously advised that it planned to
establish Calgary as its American head office, retain Nexen’s expenditure
plans, list on the Toronto Stock Exchange, and support oil sands research.

194. Press Release, Industry Canada, Industry Minister Clement Confirms BHP Billiton’s
Withdrawal of its Application for Review Under the Investment Canada Act (Nov. 14, 2010), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/064.nsf/eng/06068.html.
195. Press Release, BHP Billiton, BHP Billiton Withdraws Its Offer to Acquire Potash Corp.
and Reactivates Its Buy-Back Program (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.bhpbilliton.com/
home/investors/news/Pages/Articles/BHP%20Billiton%20Withdraws%20Its%20Offer%20To%20A
cquire%20PotashCorp%20And%20Reactivates%20Its%20Buy-back%20Program.aspx.
196. Press Release, Industry Canada, Minister of Industry Confirms Notice Sent to
PETRONAS Carigali Canada Ltd. Regarding Proposed Acquisition of Progress Energy Resources
Corp. (Oct. 19, 2012), available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/minister-industry-confirmsnotice-sent-035735659.html.
197. Press Release, Industry Canada, Petronas’ Acquisition of Progress (Dec. 7, 2012), available at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=711509.
198. Press Release, Industry Canada, CNOOC Limited’s Acquisition of Nexen Inc. (Dec. 7,
2012), available at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=711499.
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The record outlined above illustrates a trend towards increased
scrutiny of high profile transactions in Canada over the last few years. In
some ways, the debate in Canada in 2012 mirrored the Australian experience in 2009, both at a policy and political level. At the same time as
announcing the last two approvals listed above, the Minister announced
various changes to the regime as well as to the SOE policy. In particular,
the Minister advised that the future acquisition of control of a Canadian
oil sands business by an SOE will be found to be of net benefit “on an
exceptional basis only.”199
There is a concern in some Canadian quarters that the regulatory
regime is calibrated too harshly against foreign investors, particularly
Chinese SOEs, and that Canada has been losing foreign direct investment
to other countries that have better dealt with Chinese FDI, particularly
Australia.200 The legislative framework of the Canadian regime is clearly
more restrictive in its scope than that of Australia. It has therefore been
suggested that changes should be made to Canadian legislation in the
following areas:201
1. Replace the net benefit test with a contrary to national interests
test (i.e., the Australian test);
2. Include in the SOE standards guidelines undertakings at arm’s
length marketing and international price benchmarks;
3. Explicitly state that Canada has a national interest in companies
operating on a commercial basis under the laws of Canada;
4. Recognize the economic importance of resources mergers and
acquisitions; and
5. Engage with Chinese companies and make them aware of Canadian sensitivities and requirements to develop a model of
Chinese investment in Canada.

199. INDUSTRY CAN., STATEMENT REGARDING INVESTMENT BY FOREIGN STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES (2012), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk81147.html.
200. See MICHAEL GRANT, CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., FEAR THE DRAGON? CHINESE FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA (2012), available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/
abstract.aspx?did=4884; Josephine Smart, Dancing with the Dragon: Canadian Investment in China
and Chinese Investment in Canada, UNIV. CALGARY SCH. PUBLIC POL’Y, Sept. 2012, at 1, available
at http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/smart-dancing-dragon-final.pdf.
201. GRANT, supra note 200, at 25–26.
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C. New Zealand
Foreign investment in New Zealand is regulated by the Overseas
Investment Act 2005.202 Reviewable transactions are assessed by the
Minister of Finance and Minister for Land Information based on a variety of prescriptive criteria, including “likely” benefit for New Zealand
where sensitive land is involved.203 The Overseas Investment Office review applies to transactions that result in overseas investment in significant business assets or overseas investments in sensitive land.204 The Act
proceeds on the basis that it is a “privilege” for overseas persons to own
or control sensitive New Zealand assets.205 The Act is unusual in its focus on land.206
Overseas investment in significant business assets is defined as the
acquisition by an overseas person of a 25% or more ownership or control
interest where the value of the securities acquired exceeds NZ$100 million, the establishment of a business by an overseas person involving
expenditures exceeding NZ$100 million, or the acquisition of a foreign
person of property used in carrying on a business exceeding NZ$100
million.207 An overseas investment in sensitive land is defined as the acquisition by an overseas person of land that is scheduled as sensitive
land, or a 25% ownership or control interest in a person that owns an interest in such sensitive land.208 For these purposes, a 25% or more ownership or control interest is a beneficial interest in 25% or more of securities, the power to control the composition of 25% or more of the governing body, or the right to exercise 25% or more of voting power.209

202. Overseas Investment Act 2005 (N.Z.); Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, SR
2005/220 (N.Z.).
203. Overseas Investment Act 2005 § 16(e)(ii).
204. Id. § 10(1). A separate regime applies to the acquisition of fishing quotas. Id. § 10(2).
205. Id. § 3.
206. New Zealand legislation has historically discouraged the undue aggregation of land. Heatley & Howell, supra note 5, at 22. The predecessor Overseas Investment Act 1973 had dealt with
investment in businesses and the Land Settlement Promotion and Land Acquisition Act 1952 had
dealt with the purchase of farm land.
207. Overseas Investment Act 2005 § 13(1). For Australian non-government investors, the
threshold is increased to NZ $477 million in 2013 (indexed for inflation thereafter). Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, SR 2005/220, reg 36(A), sch 5 (N.Z.).
208. Overseas Investment Act 2005 § 12. Schedule 1 lists various categories of land, including
non-urban land exceeding five hectares; land on islands or lake beds; heritage order land; historic
places exceeding 0.4 hectares; land adjoining foreshore exceeding 0.2 hectares; land adjacent to
historic areas, parks, seas, lakes; or heritage areas exceeding 0.4 hectares. The Act also extends to a
situation where an owner of land becomes an overseas person. Id. § 12(b)(iii).
209. Id. § 6(4).
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An overseas “person” is an individual who is neither a New Zealand citizen nor a resident, or a company where overseas persons have
25% or more of securities, the power to control the composition of 25%
or more of the governing body, or the right to exercise 25% or more of
voting power.210 The restrictions apply to both transactions involving
foreign persons and their associates.211
Transactions subject to review must be notified to the Overseas Investment Office before the overseas investment is given effect.212 The
regime does not provide for time limits in which consent must be given.
Applications are generally processed and approved by the Overseas Investment Office under delegated authority, with more significant decisions made by the relevant Ministers.213 The regime provides a mechanism for approvals to be given subject to conditions.214
Where the transaction involves significant business assets, the criteria for review are the business experience acumen of the person, the financial commitment demonstrated by the person, and the good character
of the person (the character test).215 Much more extensive economic review criteria apply to transactions involving sensitive land, in addition to
the criteria above:
 The person must intend to reside in New Zealand, or the deciding authority must find that the investment will or is likely to
“benefit New Zealand,” and if the transaction involves nonurban land, the benefit will be or is likely to be “substantial and
identifiable.”216
 If the transaction involves farmland, the land must have been
offered to New Zealanders on the open market.217
The “benefit to New Zealand” analysis requires the Ministers to
consider a range of additional factors, including job opportunities, intro210. Id. § 7(2). Similar definitions apply to partnerships and trusts.
211. This extends to persons controlling a person and persons acting in concert. Id. § 8.
212. Id. § 11. Failure to obtain consent is an offense, id. § 42, and an investment made without
consent may be cancelled by a party to the transaction who does not need consent or by a court on
application of the regulator. Id. § 29(1)(c).
213. Id. §§ 30–37. Business decisions are made by the Minister of Finance. Sensitive land
decisions are made by the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Land Information. Legislation,
Ministers & Delegated Powers, LAND INFO. NEW ZEALAND, http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseasinvestment/ about-oio/legislation-delegations (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
214. Overseas Investment Act 2005 §25(1)(c).
215. Id. § 18.
216. Id. § 16(1)(e).
217. Id. § 16(1)(f); Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, SR 2005/220, regs 4–11.
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duction of new technology, export impacts, productivity impact, impact
on development investment, impact on processing primary products,
likelihood of resulting improved relations with another country, impact
on New Zealand’s image, impact on important infrastructure, involvement of New Zealand, impact on government policy and strategy, protection of historic heritage, wildlife, and indigenous fauna, and whether
foreshore, seabed, or riverbed has been offered to the crown.218
In New Zealand, no separate regime applies to SWFs or SOEs.
Some of the more contentious decisions made under the New Zealand
regime in recent years are listed below. As with other Western screening
regimes,
the
rejection
of
applications
is
rare.219
Date
2008

Transaction
Proposed acquisition by Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board of a 40%
investment in Auckland International Airport Limited for NZ$1.75 billion.220 The proposal led to significant political debate as to whether SWF
investment of this kind should be permitted in this kind of infrastructure
asset. The debate resulted in the inclusion of the strategic infrastructure test
in the Regulations. The transaction was rejected by the Minister on the basis
that there were no substantial and identifiable benefits to New Zealand.221
2009– Acquisition by Haier (Chinese SOE) of 100% of Fisher & Paykel Applianc2012 es, a white goods manufacturer, for NZ$740 million. Haier had initially acquired a 20% investment in 2009 as part of a distressed capital raising. Approved.222

218. Overseas Investment Act 2005 §17(2); Overseas Investment Regulations SR 2005/220,
reg 28. A detailed business plan must be submitted with the application addressing the benefit test.
219. Between 2006 and 2010 the Overseas Investment Office refused fourteen out of the 738
applications made. Peter Enderwick, Inward FDI in New Zealand and Its Policy Context, VALE
COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INT’L INV., 4 (July 17, 2012), http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/
vale/documents/NZ_IFDI_17_July_2012_-_FINAL.pdf.
220. The summary of this transaction is taken from Heatley & Howell, supra note 5, at 41–46.
221. Overseas Investment Act 2005: Reasons for Decisions by Relevant Ministers, OVERSEAS
INV. OFFICE, 6 (April 11, 2008), http://www.linz.govt.nz/docs/miscellaneous/min-decisions.pdf
(N.Z.). This decision was made despite the fact that the investment was approved by Auckland International Airports’ shareholders and would have resulted in private gains accruing to New Zealand
investors. Id.
222. Decision Summary Case: 201220035, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/docs/overseas-investment/decisions/2012-10/c2012200
35.pdf (N.Z.).

2014]
Date
2009–
2011

2010

2010

2012

Foreign Direct Investment by State Controlled Entities

577

Transaction
Acquisition by Agria Corp. (Chinese NYSE listed agricultural company)
with New Hope Group (Chinese private agribusiness company) and Maori
investment entity of an aggregate 51% interest in PGG Wrightson, an agricultural services company, for NZ$250 million. Approved.223
Acquisition by Bright Dairy & Food Co. (Chinese SOE) of a 51% shareholding in Synlait, a dairy producer, for an undisclosed consideration. Approved.224
Proposed acquisition by Natural Dairy225 of Crafar Farms, one of New Zealand’s largest dairy farms, for an undisclosed consideration.226 The proposal
was rejected by the OIO on the basis that certain of the investors failed the
character tests.227
Proposed acquisition by Milk New Zealand Holdings Ltd.228 of Crafar
Farms for an undisclosed consideration. The proposal was approved based
on a Ministers’ finding of substantial and identifiable benefit.229
This decision was subject to legal challenge by a potential rival New Zealand purchaser and Maori land trust. The legal challenge failed, despite a
finding that aspects of the decision required reconsideration.230 In that respect, the comparison with the U.S. Ralls231 litigation is of interest.

223. Decision Summary Case: 201110005, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Apr. 15, 2011),
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/docs/overseas-investment/decisions/2011-04/c20111
0005.pdf (N.Z.); Decision Summary Case: 200920070, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Nov. 16, 2009),
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/200911/C200920070.pdf (N.Z.).
224. Decision Summary Case: 201020022, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/201009/c201020022.pdf (N.Z.).
225. Bright Dairy & Food Co. is a company controlled by Chinese nationals. Corporate Profile, NATURAL DAIRY (NZ) HOLDINGS LTD., http://www.naturaldairy.hk/index.php?route=aboutus/
aboutus&aboutus_id=1 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (China).
226. The farms were in administration. Receivers Running the Ruler over Crafar Farms Bids,
NAT’L BUS. REV. (July 8, 2010), http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/receivers-running-ruler-over-crafarfarms-bids-125824 (N.Z.). The comparison to the Australian experience with Cubbie station is apposite.
227. Decision Summary Case: 201010030/201020032, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Dec. 22,
2010), http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/
2010-12/c201010030-201020032.pdf (N.Z.).
228. An entity controlled by a Chinese national. Decision Summary Case: 201110035,
OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/docs/overseasinvestment/decisions/2012-04/c201110035.pdf (N.Z.).
229. Id.
230. Tiroa E and Te Hape B Trusts v Chief Executive of Land Information [2012] NZHC 147
(N.Z.); Tiroa E and Te Hape B Trusts v Chief Executive of Land Information [2012] NZCA
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Transaction
Proposed acquisition by China Forest Group Corp. (Chinese SOE) of part
of the forestry assets of NZ Superannuation Fund for an undisclosed consideration. The proposal was approved232 with the imposition of conditions
requiring the appointment of New Zealand persons to the board of the acquirer and the provision of student scholarships in New Zealand.
The New Zealand regime is not without its significant policy perversities. As applied to FDI, application of the stricter economic review
criteria entirely depends on whether the investee company owns sensitive
land, even though that sensitive land may be peripheral to the activities
of the investee.233 Similarly, transactions have been blocked where foreign-to-foreign transactions involve sensitive land assets that are somewhat peripheral to the business being conducted.234
That being said, there are some aspects of the New Zealand regime
that are of interest to an Australian observer:
 Simply expressed legislation;
 Comprehensive identification of the economic factors to be applied in the decision-making process;
 Transparent reporting of factors considered in making a decision;
 A clearly expressed strategic policy of seeking increased FDI
from China.235
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Australian review process is structurally designed to facilitate
the approval of the overwhelming majority of investment applications.
Some have argued that Australia’s regime imposes a measurable cost

355(N.Z.); Tiroa E Hape and Te Hape B Trusts v Chief Executive of Land Information [2012] NZSC
85 (N.Z.).
231. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 926 F. Supp. 2d 71, 91
(D.D.C. 2013).
232. Decision Summary Case: 201220072, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/docs/overseas-investment/decisions/2013-03/c2012200
72.pdf (N.Z.).
233. Heatley & Howell, supra note 5, at 48–49 (discussing case study).
234. Id. at 49–51.
235. N.Z. TRADE & ENTER. & MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, OPENING DOORS TO
CHINA: NEW ZEALAND’S 2015 VISION, at 25 (2012), available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloa
ds/NZinc/NZInc-%20Strategy%20-%20China.pdf (Strategic Goal 4 is to “[i]ncrease bilateral investment to levels that reflect the growing commercial relationship with China”).
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through rejection, excessive conditions imposed on transactions and investments deferred by the regime.236 Those claims seem overblown. As
the case studies and statistics outlined above demonstrate, the reality is
that the Australian record is strong in facilitating and encouraging FDI.
It can be argued that the structure of the Australian regime does not
sit well with Australia’s obligations under the OECD regime (particularly the 2009 Recommendations) in the following areas:
 The OECD Council recommends that transparency and predictability requires that there be strict time limits applied to review
procedures for foreign investments. The experience with some
of the Chinese SOE investments since 2008 does not suggest a
high degree of correlation with this recommendation.
 The OECD Council recommends that, based on proportionality,
investment decisions be narrowly focused on concerns relating
to national security. The national interest criteria in Australia
are certainly much broader and more opaque than that standard.
 The OECD Council recommends, based on accountability principles, that there be the possibility for foreign investors to seek
review of decisions to restrict foreign investment through administrative procedures or before judicial or administrative
courts. The Australian regime does not reflect such a feature.
Moving from these concerns, there are a number of areas that could be
advanced by the Australian government to better advance the regulation
of FDI consistent with the OECD principles.
First, it is clear that regulating FDI is an issue of global concern and
involves an ongoing dialogue in globalized markets. Bodies such as the
OECD and the IMF have made substantial contributions to this debate in
recent years. The Australian government should renew its efforts for international consensus on these issues and, over time, move its policy settings to reflect that consensus.237 Linked to this should be increased intergovernmental dialogue by Australia, particularly with BRIC nations that
have large SOE sectors, in an effort to improve understanding of the
236. In 2008, ITS Global estimated that Australia’s regulatory regime costs the Australian
economy at least $5.5 billion a year through delays or deterrence of foreign investment. Foreign
Direct Investment in Australia—The Increasing Cost of Regulation, ITS GLOBAL, 21–22 (Sept. 9,
2008), http://www.itsglobal.net/sites/default/files/itsglobal/Research%20Report%20on%20Foreign%
20Direct%20Investment%20and%20the%20Increasing%20Cost%20of%20Regulation%20in%20Au
stralia%20%282008%29.pdf (N.Z.); see also Kirchner, supra note 6, at 8–9.
237. It is interesting to note that each of the comparative regimes described above specify the
relevant factors that should be considered in making decisions.
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concerns on both sides.238 Rather than removing the byzantine edifice of
the existing statutory regime in the short-term, the focus of government
action should be to embrace OECD and IMF best practices in the practical implementation of its decision making.239 Long-term best results
would entail Australia’s embrace of best practice global trends, removing
a national interest test and replacing it with narrower national security
tests.240 But it should be consistent with greater global consensus around
these issues.
Second, the dollar thresholds under the Act could be raised to a
much higher level, as has been the recent experience in Canada.241 This
should be true of general investment as well as SWF and SOE investment. Third, there could be less reliance on conditions and more reliance
on domestic regulation to regulate commercial behavior. The imposition
of conditions on SOE behavior has been a particular irritant to Chinese
investors.242
As to the issues surrounding strategic FDI by Chinese SOEs in
Australia, the recent developments in the Australia–China relationship
generally suggest that this will remain a sensitive and difficult issue for
some time.243

238. See Peter Drysdale, Australia: Time to Adapt, E. ASIA FORUM Q., Apr.–June 2012, at 31,
32.
239. Simplifying the byzantine structure would, of course, be desirable if politically achievable. Each of the comparative regimes described above are good case studies of simpler regulation.
240. Steven Kirchner suggests that the Act and related legislation should be amended to replace the current national interest test with distinct “national security” and “national economic welfare” tests. The Federal Cabinet should rule on investment proposals raising specific national security concerns. All other foreign direct investment proposals should be considered by an independent
statutory body subject to a national economic welfare test that would be binding on the government
of the day and be subject to administrative and judicial review. Kirchner, supra note 6, at 17–18.
241. See id. at 18. The Canadian approach of linking a higher review threshold to WTO membership has much to commend it.
242. Larum & Qian, supra note 43, at 19; Kirchner, supra note 6, at 18; Drysdale, supra note
238, at 31–32.
243. Some suggestions to develop better trust include improved communication and engagement; enhanced cooperation in key investment sectors; and the conclusion of the Australia–China
Free Trade Agreement. See Larum & Qian, supra note 43, at 18–22; see also supra Part VI.C (discussing the New Zealand approach).

